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                                         SUMMARY 
 
 
Just War Theory stands mid–way between permissivism and absolute pacifism. On the 
one hand, it rejects the amorality of permissivism in war, and the excessive optimism of 
absolute pacifism, on the other hand. The theory is thus a plausible attempt to prevent the 
rush to send troops to war on the slightest provocation. To this effect, it sets out some 
requirements that must be fulfilled before a state can justifiably wage a war (jus ad 
bellum).  It also limits the catastrophic consequences of war by proscribing certain acts in 
the battlefield, (jus in bello).  Just War Theory seeks to regulate the ending of wars, in 
order to maintain the rights of the defeated aggressor state and her citizens. This is to 
prevent the victorious victim or any vindicator from engaging in a war of revenge, (jus 
post bellum). 
 
 The communal dimension of war coupled with the modern development of military 
technology has made it difficult for states to adhere strictly to the normative requirements 
of Just War Theory despite the theory’s plausible attempt to limit the catastrophic 
consequences of war. 
 
 In the bid to implement the principles of   jus post bellum a danger may ensue. For 
instance, in the process of rehabilitating the unjust aggressor politically, a case of “forced 
acculturation” may arise—this visualizes an attempt by a more powerful culture to infuse 
the elements of its alien cultural system on a people with different cultural background. 
  
v 
To avoid this particular danger, the victorious victim or any vindicator must realize that 






    
                                CHAPTER ONE 
       
        
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
“If you want peace prepare for war.” This ancient Roman saying captures the very reality 
of the human condition. A retrospect of our past reveals that “from the earliest recorded 
events of human history all the way through the modern times, human communities have 
engaged in armed conflict as a method of dispute resolution.”1 According to Barbara 
Ehrenreich, only three creatures engage in warfare - humans, chimpanzees, and ants.2 
However, war in the strict sense of the word is a prerogative of the human species. 
Webster’s Dictionary defines war as “a conflict of arms between hostile parties or 
nations.” An apt definition of war from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy reads, 
“War is an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political 
communities.” Political communities include also entities that either are states or intend 
to become states. Karl Von Clausewitz defines war as “nothing but a duel on a larger 
scale”. He sees War as an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will. “Physical 
force is the means; to impose our will on the enemy is the object.”3 War is one of the 
means used by people and governments around the world to achieve personal or political 
goals. It is the use of force instead of persuasion to achieve one’s goals.  
                                                 
1 Mark De Forrest,    “Just War Theory and The Recent U.S Air Strikes Against Iraq,” (http://www.across-
borders.com/deforres.htm. 02/03/2005). 
 
2 Barbara Ehrenreich, “The Roots of War,” The Progressive, April, 2003. 
 
3 Karl Von Clausewitz,   War, Politics and Power, trans. and ed. by Edward M Collins, Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1962,   p. 63.   
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European history is ladened with themes like “hundred years war” “sixty years war” 
“thirty years war”, etc. Many used to doubt the veracity of such accounts, but the events 
of the last century, still extending to our time, have opened the eyes of many. For more 
than thirty years the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been engaged in armed struggle 
and violence in order to end the British rule in Northern Ireland. The Palestinians have 
been struggling against the Israeli occupation for more than fifty years and still blood 
baths through suicide bombings and Israeli counter responses have no end in sight. The 
Basques have not relented in their use of violence and terrorism to liberate their region 
from the Spanish rule. The war in Yugoslavia that disintegrated the country left hundreds 
of thousands dead. We cannot forget the Gulf war, the Second World War, the Korean 
War, the Kashmir struggle between India and Pakistan, the invasion of Grenada and 
Panama by the United States forces, the Argentine and British war over the control of 
Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, the Vietnam War and the recent American 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Africa is not spared of wars.  Different regions in Africa had experienced or still 
experience war and violence. The longest state of war and violence was in the then South 
African Apartheid state. Think of Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia, Nigerian civil war, and Sierra Leone. 
 
All these parties were involved in violence and war for different reasons and motives. 
From some of these wars, one can claim that violence and war was necessary. Thus the 
morality or justification of violence, whether in the micro or macro settings, is one of the 
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most enduring philosophical problems of all ages. In the course of time, many questions 
have been raised on the morality of war. Is it morally permissible to go to war? Can 
moral principles even be applied to war? What is morally permissible to do in war? These 
questions, and their corresponding answers, stem from the conflicting positions 
concerning war and its use. 
 
1.1 THEORIES ON THE MORALITY OF WAR 
Three philosophical theories stand out, which give conflicting responses to the questions 
concerning war. They are Permissivism (Realism), Pacifism and Just War Theory. 
 
1.1.1 PERMISSIVISM 
Permissivism puts a crucial question mark on whether moral principles can even be 
applied to war. Permissivism adopts the Roman proverb, “inter arma silent leges” (in 
time of war the law falls silent). The English put it thus “all is fair in love and war”. This 
outright moral nihilism with respect to war stems from the fact that morality after all is 
concerned with evaluating choices, whereas war is a matter not of choice but of necessity. 
As Walzer presents the doctrine:  
War lies beyond moral judgement, it is a world apart where life itself is at 
stake, where human nature is reduced to its elemental forms, where self 
interest and necessity prevail and men and women do what they must do 
to save themselves and their communities, and morality and law have no 
place.4 
                                                 





Permissivism has different forms, but all accept the necessity of war. Orend, writing 
in the Stanford Encyclopedia, holds that for the permissivist, talk of morality of 
warfare is pure bunk: ethics has got nothing to do with the rough and tumble world of 
global politics, where only the strong and cunning survive. Clausewitz’s opinion 
seems to be the guiding principle for the permissivist. He unequivocally upholds 
permissivism: 
The use of force is theoretically without limits. Philanthropic souls may 
imagine that there is a way to disarm or overthrow our adversary without 
much blood shed, and that is what the art of war should seek to achieve. 
Agreeable as it may sound, this is a false idea, which must be 
demolished…. We can never introduce a modifying principle into the 
philosophy of war without committing an absurdity… So we repeat, war is 
an act of force, and there is no limit to the application of that force.5 
 
One final comment on Permissivism or Realism is that it is a belief that war is an 
intractable part of an anarchical world system, therefore unavoidable. But once it is 
started, anything goes as long as victory is the ultimate goal. The distinguished criminal 
law theorist George Fletcher summarizes permissivism by saying that “Justice and war 
are incompatible ideas. If we are at war, justice is irrelevant and we should pursue our 
national policies without worrying about moral nuances of equally balanced scale.”6 
Some proponents of Realism include Thucydides, Machiavelli, Karl Von Clausewitz, 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger. 
 
                                                 
5 Karl von Clausewitz, ibid., p.64-5. 
 
6 Cf. Washington Post, October 6, 2001. Quoted in Jeffrey G. Murphy, “September 11: Some Philosophical 
Reflections” in War and Border Crossing, ed. by Peter A. French and Jackson A. Short Oxford: Rowman 




1.1.2      PACIFISM 
The direct opposite of permissivism is pacifism. In the present context, pacifism stands 
for the moral renunciation of war. It is “anti-war-ism”. I also wish to point out that the 
present discussion on pacifism is on the pacifist response to war and does not exhaust the 
issue of pacifism. There are forms and aspects of pacifism that are not central to this 
discussion simply because they do not include or imply opposition to war. An example is 
private pacifism, which disavows the use of force by an individual in self defence while 
permitting its usage in the defence of the state. 
 
Generally speaking a pacifist rejects war in favour of peace. For a pacifist, war is morally 
unacceptable simply because the presumption is always against taking the life of a human 
person and the reification of his being. As Simone Weil puts it in her comment on war as 
portrayed in Homer’s Iliad, “War is that which turn any body who is subjected to it into a 
thing. Exercised to the limit it turns man into a thing in the most literal sense, it makes a 
corpse out of his body. Somebody was here, and the next minute there is nobody here at 
all.”7   
  
Even where the renunciation of war rests on moral grounds, the nature and extent of that 
renunciation allows a number of important distinctions to be made. In one version of 
pacifism, there are no conceivable circumstances in which war is morally permissible.  In 
other words, war is rejected absolutely. This kind of pacifism, namely absolute pacifism, 
                                                 
7 Simone Weil, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force” originally published in Mary McCarthy’s English 
translation in Politics in November 1945 and reprinted in Peter Mayer (ed.) The Pacifist Conscience. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966, pp291-316.Also quoted in Ronald J.Glossop, Confronting War, North 
Carolina: Macfarland &company Inc, 2001, p.3. 
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can be seen from a deontological perspective. An absolute deontological pacifist will see 
it as a duty not to kill any human being, and since duties are moral actions that are 
required or demanded in all pertinent circumstances, then killing is every where and any 
where impermissible. Most advocates of absolute pacifism can be seen in religious 
circles. The first problem for deontological pacifism is the potential collision of duties. 
What if force is to be used to halt an aggressor who endangers the pacifist’s life, or the 
life of an innocent? Regarding the pacifist’s own life, it can be argued that he or she 
possesses no right of self-defense, and must "turn the other cheek." 
 
However, a more serious question for the absolute pacifist of the deontological kind is 
whether the duty to respect others outweighs the duty to respect oneself.  If the pacifist 
argues that his life is his own to lay down in the face of aggression (as a moral principle, 
as an example of martyrdom, etc), the problem intensifies when the life of another is 
threatened, whom the pacifist is in a position to assist, and who, as a living subject, may 
prefer life over death. The pacifist who claims that he has no duty to intervene in saving 
others treads a precarious moral path here; for the sake of his own beliefs, could the 
pacifist consistently ignore the violence meted upon others? 
 
A pacifist, who is a consequentialist, might argue that the evil procured by war and 
killing far outweigh any good that may result from it. The consequences of all wars are 
outrageous. Therefore war is nowhere permissible. Tolstoy can be said to be an example 
of a pacifist of the consequentialist turn. He wrote: 
  
7 
They talk to us of the rules of war, of chivalry, of flags of truce of mercy 
to the unfortunate, and so on. It’s all rubbish…If there was none of this 
magnanimity in war, we should go to war only when it was worth while 
going to certain death, as now… war is no courtesy but the most horrible 
thing in life; and we ought to understand that, and not play at war.8  
However, absolute consequentialist principles are exceedingly difficult to sustain. As 
Alexander Moseley puts it, 
[T]hey are firstly based on a particular reading of history, a reading that 
can emphasize ruinous results over any good that may ultimately have 
arisen. They are empirical judgements on the past and as such open to not 
only historical critique but also the logical argument that what was true 
yesterday may not be true tomorrow (or at least cannot be proven to be 
so).9 
Whereas past wars were wholly detrimental to the human race as a whole, tomorrow’s 
wars, because of new technology or strategy, or even a new ethic, may not be. 
Accordingly, the moral rule may in principle change and therefore cannot be held 
absolutely. 
 
Another version of pacifism is selective in its rejection of war, prohibiting war in some 
circumstances but not in others. This version may be termed contingent pacifism.10 
                                                 
8L. Tolstoy, War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p .830-1. 
 
9 Cf.  “Pacifism” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  (www.iep.utm.edu. 02/04/2006). 
 




Contingent pacifism accepts the moral permissibility of war, at least in principle, even 
when the circumstances in which war becomes permissible are very narrowly drawn. 
Contingent pacifism itself may be seen to rest on diverse grounds and to involve very 
different degrees of opposition to war; and while some forms of contingent pacifism are 
indistinguishable from a just war approach, some are virtually indistinguishable from 
absolute pacifism.  
 
A form of contingent pacifism objects to a specific form of modern warfare, such as 
nuclear or biological war, which is seen as intrinsically evil and therefore morally 
impermissible. Bertrand Russell is an example of such pacifists. The absolute prohibition 
of these forms of warfare rests on the judgement that they are unavoidably indiscriminate. 
The enormous destructive potential of the weaponry means that the recourse to war in 
these cases necessarily violates the principle of proportionality. Moreover since the 
weapons are unavoidably indiscriminate in their effects, they cannot be used without 
massive and systematic violation of the principle of non-combatant immunity. The 
immorality of use may be seen to condemn the possession of such weapons, so that “even 
as part of a defensive and deterrent strategy the production and deployment of such 
weapons is seen as morally indefensible.”11 Another form of contingent pacifism 
expresses a deep moral skepticism not only to aspects of modern warfare, but also to 
modern wars in general. It maintains that no modern war could in fact meet the criteria of 
Just War Theory. Robert Holmes is a contemporary example of this type of pacifist. He 
wrote:  
                                                 
11 Ibid., p.80. 
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 My contention is that war in the modern world is not morally justified 
…the argument is not that wars under  all conceivable conditions are 
morally impermissible,  absolutist position that properly understood, is 
neither particularly interesting nor defensible. My position differs little in 
principle from that of the ordinary person …he believes that war is 
justified in circumstances calling for national defense, or to assist in the 
defense of other nations, and the like, whereas I maintain that the 
conditions that might theoretically justify war simply are not met in the 
actual world, hence that war is impermissible in the world as we know it.12   
                       
In other words, Pacifists suggest that it is significantly utopian to think that when nations 
conflict, they might rise to the level of limited barbarity, that typically characterizes 
violent conflicts between individuals, rather than wallowing in amoral pit where they 
appear to have settled, surrounded by enormous arsenals.13  This brings us to the Just War 
Theory, considered by experts as “the most influential perspective on the ethics of war 
and peace.”14      
 
1.1.3 JUST WAR THEORY 
Just War Theory stands mid-way between permissivism and absolute pacifism. On the 
one hand it rejects the amorality of permissivism. Just War Theory insists on the moral 
                                                 
12R. L.Holmes, On War and Morality, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, p.14. 
 
13 Cf. T. Nagel, “War and Massacre” in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, (eds.)  John Perry and Michael Bratman, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.614. 
 




determination of war where that is possible and on the moral renunciation of war where it 
is not. On the other hand, Just War Theory does not subscribe to the excessive optimism 
of absolute pacifism.  A world devoid of wars, imagined by the pacifist, is not actually 
attainable. “It is only conceivable.”15 Another problem with Pacifism, as Just War 
theorists like Walzer will say, is the problem of the “scruples of the invading aggressor”. 
What happens to non-violent resistance if an invading aggressor is utterly brutal, 
remorseless and lacks any moral scruples?  Would civilian resistance work well against 
invaders who sent out squads of soldiers to kill civilian leaders, who arrested suspects, 
established concentration camps, and exiled large numbers of people from areas where 
the resistance was strong to distant and desolate parts of the country? Nonviolent defense 
is no defense at all against tyrants or conquerors ready to adopt such measures.16 Pacifism 
to this kind of aggressor will be seen as weakness, and such a people deserve nothing but 
crushing. Here nonviolence under extreme condition allows violence directed at oneself 
but not at one’s murderers.17  
 
We have some indications from history, especially Nazi Germany, on how some invading 
aggressor can be brutal and ruthless. It is true that no form of non–violent resistance 
would have stopped Hitler and the Nazi army from conquering the whole of Europe and 
beyond. Therefore using war to confront war may be the only alternative to the search for 
peace. This may be best put in the words of Sergio Cotta who said: 
                                                 
15  M. Walzer, op. cit., p.331. 
 





 In fact if we have violence in everything and every where we have one 
and only one choice: either to suffer it with resignation (in which case 
violence appears to be the supreme law of life, man’s destiny) or to try to 
eliminate it. But if we choose the second, we become prisoners of an all –
encompassing premise: in order to eliminate violence it is necessary to 
make use of it, since there is no other means for antiviolent action. Such 
action, therefore will not renounce the materiality of violence, but will 
reverse its direction: something destructive will be rendered constructive 
in the hope that through this reversal it will be neutralized and will 
disappear.18 
 
If we want to be realistic about our human condition, we cannot but affirm that Just War 
Theory attempts to think morally about war. The United States of America conference of 
Catholic Bishops in a document entitled “The Harvest of Justice Sown in Peace”(1993) 
states, “In a disordered world where peaceful resolution of conflicts sometimes fails, the 
just war tradition provides an important moral framework for restraining and regulating 
the limited use of force by governments and international organizations.”19 
 
 
1.1.3.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUST WAR THEORY 
                                                 
18S. Cotta, Why Violence? A Philosophical Interpretation, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1985, 
p.9. Quoted in R. L Holmes, On War and Morality, op. cit., p.27. 
 




The Just War tradition has a long history dating back to St Augustine of Hippo and 
Thomas Aquinas. However during the course of its development, two distinct streams can 
be noticed. One stream, as George Lucas puts it, “emerges concurrently with the modern 
development of international law”.20  This stream Walzer termed the “legalist 
paradigm.”21  It originated from the opposition of the faculty of the University of 
Salamanca to their own king and country in Spanish wars of colonial conquest against 
American-Indians in the early sixteen century. A prominent member of that faculty, 
Dominican scholar Francisco De Vitoria, condemned the wars of conquest on the basis of 
what he termed Jus Gentium, which refers to a set of basic legal and moral standards, 
binding within and between all nations that have achieved a modicum of social 
organization.22 Its subsequent proponents include the Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius, 
whose De Juri Belli et Paci (On the Rights of War and Peace) was published in 
1625.Other philosophers who can be identified with this stream include Samuel Von 
Pufendorf and Immanuel Kant. The contemporary apostles of this legalist tradition are 
Michael Walzer, Richard Falk and Brian Orend. 
 
The legalist tradition tends to support a compromise position, first hammered out 
pragmatically in the peace of Westphalia 1648, rooted in the distinctly modern 
                                                 
20 G. Lucas, “Defence or Offence? Two streams of Just War Tradition,” in War and Border Crossings, op. 
cit., p.50. 
  
21 M. Walzer, op., cit., p.58. 
 
22 G. Riechberg, “Francisco De Vitoria De Indis and De Jure Bello:Philosophy Meets War,” in Classics of 
Western Philosophy, (ed.) George Grawn, Gregory Reichberg and Bernard Schumacher. London: 




commitment to the value of autonomy and individual sovereignty.23  The nation - state 
would be the highest level of government, subservient to no other. The world is thus 
described as comprising an “international community” of individuals, sovereign states, an 
articulation  that stems from the natural condition of biological individuals. The legalist 
tradition therefore holds that the territorial integrity of states can never be justifiably 
violated without a just cause.24 
 
The older and more classical tradition of Just War Theory is more normative, stemming 
from philosophical and theological reflections by the likes of Cicero, Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas and Francisco Suarez.  This stream predates the legalist paradigm and the 
Westphalia treaty, and this older tradition contains no mention of sovereign states and 
their alleged rights. Contemporary adherents include Ronald Bainton, Paul Ramsey, 
Bryan Heir and James Turner Johnson. 
 
The major difference between the legalist tradition and that of the classical tradition is 
that while the legalist tradition justifies war in recourse to a “wrong” received, the 
classical tradition uses religious terms like “evil” and “good”. War is seen by the classical 
tradition as an act to punish those who do evil. The sovereign is seen as the messenger of 
God who bears the sword to defend his people against internal strife by punishing those 
who do evil, as justified by St. Paul in verse 4 of chapter 13 in the letter to the Romans. It 
then means that the classical tradition has a more theological root and base than that of 
the legalist tradition, which is more philosophical. Again, with the emergence of the 
                                                 





legalist tradition, the religious justification of wars, which was previously based on the 
judgement of the church, disappears. Nation states now have the onus to justify their 
wars. 
 
All in all, the Just War Theory is concerned with the justification of why and how wars 
are fought (Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello). The grammatical difference between ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ point to deep issues. While Jus ad bellum is adjectival in character, that is 
qualifying an intended war as ‘just’,  Jus in bello is adverbial that is describing the actual 
actions taken in the battlefield. Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments about 
aggression and self - defense; Jus in bello about the observance or violation of the 
customary and positive rules of engagement. The two sorts of judgment, though logically 
independent should be complementary for a war to qualify as ‘just’ from the perspective 
of Just War Theory. It is perfectly possible for a war to satisfy the jus ad bellum criteria, 
but turn out to be unjust because it violates the rules of the battlefield.    A third element 
is the Jus post bellum, which tries to regulate the ending of wars and ease the transition 
from war back to peace. The major aim of the Just War Theory is, on the one hand, to 
avert the Thrasymachian dictum of might is right, and on the other hand, to “reconcile 
might with right (sein and sollen) by making the former serve the later or by curtailing 
might with right.”25 On the basis of these premises, war was seen as a just response to 
unprovoked aggression, and more generally, as the ultimate means to restoring a right 
that has been violated. 
 
                                                 
25 R. Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Jus ad bellum / Jus in bello,” in the International Review of the Red 




  CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 JUS AD BELLUM 
Jus ad bellum is a Latin term, which refers to the justice of resorting to war. The Jus ad 
bellum sets out the criteria that must be satisfied before a state can go to war. Six criteria 
must each be fulfilled before a particular declaration of war is to be justified. These criteria 
are (1) Just cause (2) Legitimate authority (3) Right intention (4) Last resort (5) Probability 
of success (6) Proportionality. I will discuss each criterion fully, in order to show what it 
consists in and what it is not, the strength and problems facing each of them. 
 
2.1 JUST CAUSE 
A state is permitted to declare war, neither for the sake of going to war, nor for a show of 
state power, rather it must be for a just cause. As Kolb puts it, “A belligerent without a just 
cause had no rights; he was simply a criminal who might be executed.” 26 History is filled 
with wars that were fought with no just cause. As Hugo Grotius wrote: 
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to 
war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that 
men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all… in accordance with 
a general decree  frenzy had openly been let loose to the committing of all 
crimes.27  
                                                 
26 Robert Kolb, op. cit., p.2. 
 
27 Prolegomena, De Jure ac Pacis Libri Tres p. 44, see also R.L Holmes., “Can War Be Morally Justified?” 
in Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.), Just War Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992,  p.203. 
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Aquinas reiterated in the Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, that a just cause is required, namely 
that those who are attacked deserve it for some wrong they have done. The major 
question remains, what is a just cause? Or what does a just cause consist in? The causes 
frequently mentioned include: self - defence from external attack, and the defence of 
others from such, the protection of innocents from brutal and aggressive regimes, and 
punishment for wrong doing.28  
 
All the above can be summed up in Vitoria’s notion of a wrong received. As he puts it, 
“there is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely a wrong received.”29 
However, he was quick to add that not every wrong can suffice for commencing a war.30 
Walzer himself talks of aggression as the only condition that justifies war. Aggression for 
him involves any use of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial 
integrity of another, and this is seen as a criminal act.31 A just war then, as Augustine puts 
it, “is one that avenges wrongs, that is when a nation or state has to be punished either for 
refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized 
injuriously.”32  Therefore in order to punish and defend itself from the unjust aggressor, a 
state goes into war with the aggressor, since in the words of Victoria, “were no 
                                                 
28 B. Orend,   Michael Walzer On War and Justice. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000, 
p.87. 
 
29 Francisco De Vitoria, De Indis et De Iure Belli Relectiones New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1964, 
p.170. 
 
30 Ibid., p.171. 
 
31 M.Walzer, op. cit., p. 62. 
 




vengeance taken on enemies who have done or tried to do a wrong, they would be 
emboldened to make a second attack.”33 
 
The legalist paradigm, which Walzer and other philosophers accept, sees the sovereignty 
and integrity of states as sacrosanct, and their violation as the highest aggression. The 
right of territorial integrity is the right of an independent State not to be invaded by 
another state. This right, Walzer claims, is derived from the common life its members 
have made on the particular piece of land they are in. Here there is a close connection 
between territory and community, as there is between house and home. The grounding is 
at least three - fold, firstly, in terms of securing the material needs of the community, 
secondly, in terms of acknowledging the very value of shared ways of life, and thirdly, in 
terms of the historical rootedness of this particular community in this exact physical 
space. It is the coming together of a people with the above grounding reasons that 
justifies their territorial integrity. As Walzer puts it,  
And territorial integrity is a function of national existence, not of 
nationalization. It is the coming together of a people that establishes the 
integrity of a territory. Only then can a boundary be drawn the crossing of 
which is plausibly called aggression.34  
 
The right of political sovereignty, established by the coming together of people, gives 
them the right to shape their own domestic policies within their own borders, free from 
foreign coercion or control. It is the right of a people to seek their own political destiny, 
                                                 
33 Francisco De Vitoria, ibid., p.167. 
 
34 Walzer, op. cit., p.57. 
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to select the means required to achieve it, as well as to assume the risks attending the 
journey. It is the right of people freely associated together to determine those domestic 
choices about-citizenship, representation, taxation, production, distribution, exchange, 
regulation, and so on, which shape their lives and frame their future. 
 
The violation of these rights is referred to as an act of aggression. The wrong which the 
aggressor commits, which serves as a just cause for war, “is to force men and women to 
risk their lives for the sake of their rights, it is to confront them with the choice: your 
right or your lives.”35   The major questions, as Orend sees them, are:  
Why exactly are state rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty 
worth dying for? Why are they portrayed as the foremost values of the 
international system, the violation   of which constitutes the only crime 
that states can commit against other states? Why should we believe that 
collective associations like states can have rights at all?36    
 
Walzer’s answer stems from the rights of individuals, who make up the state. He opines 
with Westlake, that “the duties and rights of states are nothing more than the duties and 
rights of men who compose them.”37 Though state sovereignty is sacrosanct, it is not an 
absolute right. In the words of Walzer: 
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 And yet the ban on boundary crossing is not absolute- in part because of 
the arbitrary and accidental character of state boundaries, in part because 
of the ambiguous relation of the political community or communities 
within those boundaries to the government that defends them.38  
 
It then follows that when the right of individuals and their common life is grossly 
violated by the government or the state, such a state loses the right of non - intervention 
and an appeal can be made to the international organizations, which will justify their 
intervening on humanitarian basis. 
 
Therefore, apart from crossing territorial boundaries, humanitarian intervention is another 
just cause for war.  In a judgement in the House of Lords in March 1999 on the Pinochet 
case, Lord Millet expressed his view by saying that the doctrine of state immunity is the 
product of classical theory, but in the modern times it no longer exists in its pure form. 
The way in which a state treats its own citizens within its own borders has now become a 
legitimate concern to the international community.39 It then follows that:  
If the dominant forces within a state are engaged in massive violations of 
human rights, the appeal to self determination   ... is not very attractive. 
That appeal has to do with the freedom of the community taken as a 
whole; it has no force when what is at stake is the bare survival or the 
minimal liberty of its members. Against the enslavement or massacre of 
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political opponents, national minorities and religious sects, there may well 
be no help unless help comes from outside. And when a government turns 
savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a 
political community to which the idea of self determination might apply.40  
 
In such a situation, humanitarian intervention becomes necessary; it then becomes a 
response to what Walzer refers to as “acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind.” 
“When people are being massacred, we don’t require that they pass the test of self help 
before coming to their aid, it is their very incapacity that brings us in.”41 Neighbors can 
no longer become mere spectators, studying one another’s misfortunes from some great 
distance, since the social life they share entails a degree of mutual concern.42 Historical 
examples abound, where humanitarian intervention served as a just cause for waging war. 
One is the Indian intervention in the then east Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, when the 
Pakistani government literally turned an army loose against its own people, or rather in 
the words of Walzer, “a Punjabi army loose on the Bengali people”, which resulted in a 
massacre of the Bengalis. Another case is the intervention in Uganda by neighboring 
Tanzania to depose Idi Amin and put an end to his blood - thirsty and self - aggrandizing 
rule.  A more recent example is the March 1999 intervention of NATO forces in the case 
of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The government of Slobodan Milosevic, having 
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perpetrated mass murder that can best be described as ethnic cleansing, forced the 
international community to intervene in order to salvage the situation.  
 
Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations, referring to the Kosovo case, 
reiterated the fact that humanitarian intervention will continue to serve as just cause for 
waging war. He said:  
The (UN) charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant 
as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human 
dignity. The fact that a conflict is internal does not give parties any right to 
disregard the most basic rules of human conduct… All our professions of 
regret, all our expressions of determination never again to permit another 
Bosnia or another Rwanda, all our claims to have learned something from 
the recent past will be cruelly mocked if we now let Kosovo become 
another killing field.43  
 
I wish to point out two things with regard to the criterion of just cause. Firstly, the total 
prohibition of territorial boundary crossing except in cases of humanitarian intervention, 
as upheld by the legalist tradition, may not have taken into consideration the issue of 
fairness44 and state security.  Justice as fairness will demand that states have a secure 
place to exist alongside others. Therefore when the existence of a state is threatened by 
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44 John Rawls writing in A Theory of Justice holds that justice as fairness “denies that the loss of freedom of 
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the nearness of another, fairness may demand that such a state cross the boundary of the 
threatening state, if by so doing it will secure itself from attack. A case I have in mind 
here is the existence of the state of Israel. 
 
After 1967, despite the resolution 24245 passed by the Security Council calling for an 
Israeli return of Arab lands (West Bank, Gaza Strip, all of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula), 
Israelis argued that Israel had to retain Arab lands conquered in 1967 because Israel has 
to secure itself from attack. Yigal Allon, one time Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, expressed the common Israeli view by saying that the pre-1967 lines 
“fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum strategic depth”, hence a return to these 
lines would create a concrete and intolerable threat to Israel’s security.46  Therefore, can 
we say that the Arab world has a just cause to wage war against Israel? or that Israel is 
right in holding Arab lands in order to protect itself ? I think that the security of states 
should be considered. If there is a case where the incursion of a state into another will 
prevent a clear case of security threat to itself, then its incursion into the threatening state 
would be justified. 
 
                                                 
45 On November 22 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242, establishing the 
principles that were to guide the negotiations for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The first point addressed by the 
resolution is the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”. The most controversial clause in 
the resolution is the call for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict” This is linked to the second unambiguous clause calling for termination of all claims or state of 
belligency” and the recognition that “every state in the area” has the “right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” Cf. The Jewish Virtual Library: A division of 
American-Israeli cooperative enterprise. (www.jewishvirtuallibrart.org/jsource/UN/meaning_of_242.html) 
( 21/01/ 2006). 
 
46 Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” in Foreign Affairs 55, October, 1976, p.41-3. 
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Another serious issue that needs consideration is the issue of commitment and risk in 
wars of intervention. If a nation intervenes to save another nation, what level of 
commitment will it make in the war? Should it measure risks to its citizens differently in 
the case of intervention than it will do in a case of self defence? The answer to the above 
questions clearly will depend on the other Jus ad bellum criteria, namely reasonable hope 
of success and right intention. It will be foolhardy for a nation to intervene in the first 
place if there is not  a reasonable hope of success. Its intention in the intervention will 
also affect the level of risk it will take. However, I want to point out that when a nation 
intervenes in a war, it has committed itself and should be able to bear the risk of the war. 
Withdrawing from a war of intervention when the perceived risk seems to be much on the 
intervening nation will lead to the danger of acting symbolically only, without the 
necessary effort needed for success.    
 
 2.2 LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
A legitimate authority must shoulder the onus of declaration of war, by the standard of 
the Just War Theory. Private individuals and groups are not permitted to take up arms 
against others, however justified their cause may appear. Only governments47 - those who 
have been entrusted with the public good - are allowed to wage war and they must do it 
openly and legally. The hypothetical social contract theory saw the sovereign as the 
protector of the rights of those who entered into the social contract, namely the citizens. 
Therefore it is pertinent that the power and authority to declare war be vested on this 
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sovereign, since waging war with a just cause is seen as the protection of the rights of the 
people. Francisco de Vitoria, reiterating the opinion of St Augustine in the Contra 
Faustum, said “The natural order, best adapted to secure the peace of mankind requires 
that the authority to make war and the advisability of it should be in the hands of the 
sovereign prince.”48 Vitoria holds that reason supports this, for the prince only holds his 
position by election of the state. Therefore he is its representative and wields its authority. 
Aristotle himself in the Politics, Bk. 4, Ch. 10, says that the prince derives his authority 
from the state, therefore he ought to use it for the good of the state. 
 
Aristotle, Vitoria and Augustine had the conception of the sovereign prince as a person 
elected by the people, but the history of states attests that not all sovereign princes come 
to power through the consent of the people. Therefore it may be an oversight or a 
misconception that the prince will always act for the interest of the state. 
 
However, the requirement of a just war to be declared by a legitimate authority comes 
with another constraint, namely ‘public declaration’. This constraint, according to Orend, 
represents a kind of check on the power of heads of states and the state mechanism in 
general, to risk the lives and liberties of their citizens in such a dangerous enterprise as 
war.49 It is also pertinent since “the people must in some public procedure, meaningfully 
consent to the launching of war on their behalf.”50 Of course, today as Walzer pointed 
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out, most leaders work hard to satisfy their subjects of the justice of their wars. They 
“render reasons” though not always honest ones. It takes courage to doubt these reasons 
or doubt them in public, and so long as they are only doubted, most men will be 
persuaded to fight.51 
 
Also, the enemy state and its member citizens are entitled to receive a public declaration 
of war so that there is no duplicitous maneuverings, that, in short, they are apprised that 
they are facing war and all it entails, as a result of their aggressive actions.52 The danger 
here, as I see it, is the possibility of compromising surprise as a military tactic with the 
public declaration of war to the enemy state. This declaration will enable the enemy to 
fortify, thus making it arduous or totally impossible for the war to be won. The public 
declaration requirement, as Orend pointed out, need not preclude a rapid and effective 
response to some ‘blitzkrieg’ instance of aggression53. Here Orend is making a statement 
akin to that of Vitoria when he said:  
A prince is not able and ought not, always to render reasons for the war to 
his subjects, and if subjects cannot serve in war except they are satisfied of 
its justice, the state will fall into grave peril and the door will be opened to 
wrong doing.54 
 
                                                 










The danger that may arise from the necessity of a rapid response to aggression without 
public declaration is the possibility of aggressive and lawless leaders feigning emergency 
and necessity. When we look at history, we are struck by the names of such aggressive 
and lawless leaders - Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and so on. 
It then follows that the danger of the criterion of legitimate authority is that stemming 
from the aggressive disposition of state leaders.  
 
Many theorists like Walzer55 and Orend56 suggest that rebels and revolutionary leaders 
with popular support are to be treated as legitimate authorities. Again, the danger of 
trivializing this criterion becomes clear, since any rebel with popular support can declare 
war. Walzer and Orend did not specify how popular this rebel or revolutionary leader 
must be. It is quite clear that every rebel will have some supporters. 
 
Another problem with the criterion of legitimate authority pertains to wars of 
humanitarian intervention. Beach rightly pointed out: 
 Arguably, if one is intervening for the sake of international peace and 
good order, then only an international authority has the right to counsel 
and declare .This could be a regional grouping such as the organization for 
security and co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or even an ad hoc alliance as 
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in the Gulf war. But all of these come ultimately under the jurisdiction of 
the United Nations, both in principle   and as a matter of practical 
politics.57  
    
Again, I find difficulty with regard to the United Nations and its powers to declare war in 
matters of humanitarian intervention. The current case of Sudan brings this difficulty to 
light. The UN was concerned in the debate whether the Darfur’s case in Sudan has 
reached the level of genocide or not, while people were being massacred. Another 
difficulty here, as Beach pointed out, is the danger of handing the case for humanitarian 
intervention to states with dubious records who are major players in the UN Security 
Council. He is concerned whether it makes “any sense to vest the conscience of mankind, 
on matters relating to humanitarian intervention, in countries such as Russia or China 
whose human rights records calls even trade relationships into question.”58   
 
So far the criterion of legitimate authority has been restricted to political legitimacy that is 
the power of Heads of states. A new question is, can the issue of legitimate authority 
embrace moral legitimacy? Theorists like Richard Miller will argue that the concept of 
legitimate authority is purely political. He said: 
 It is a condition meant to prevent non public officials from setting out to 
wage war…in short legitimate authority is tested by considerations of 
                                                 
57 Beach Hugh, ibid. 
 
58 Here Beach made allusion to China, when in February 1999 it vetoed for the continuance of UN 
preventive deployment force in Macedonia for no better reason than Macedonia’s un expected decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan-an issue totally unrelated to the Balkans crisis. This arbitrary act 
on the part of China, he says put in question her motives for not endorsing a forceful action against Serbia.  
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political legitimacy, understood in terms of how a government rules its 
citizenry. It is not a condition that imposes on a government the burden of 
maintaining morally pure relations with other nations as a condition for 
embarking on a just cause.59 
 
However, I think that the concept of legitimate authority should embrace moral 
legitimacy.  Heads of States who had previously commanded an aggressive war against 
another state cannot invoke the concept of legitimate authority to fight against an unjust 
war directed at his state. The apparent difference that seems to exist between moral and 
political legitimacy in war will collapse if international justice remains impartial.  Heads 
of States who commanded an aggressive war commit a war crime and is liable for trial 
and punishment. If tried and punished, he necessarily forfeits his position and will not be 
in a position to command any defensive war in case of a received aggression. By this 
means the apparent difference between political and moral legitimacy is maintained by 
Just War Theory. 
 
2.3 RIGHT INTENTION 
This is the third criterion of Jus ad bellum. It holds that a state must intend to fight a war 
only for the sake of a just cause. Having the right reason for going to war is not enough; 
the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior 
motives, such as revenge, ethnic hatred, religious bias, power or territorial enlargement 
are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for resorting to war 
                                                 




secured and consolidated. As Augustine puts it, “the intention to restore justice must not 
give way to the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild 
resistance and the lust of power.”60 Historical references can be made here. During the 
Gulf War, the allies set as their aim to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They did not aim to 
break the power of the Republican guards, still less topple Saddam Hussein. When they 
had succeeded in their limited aim, they stopped. They savageness of fighting on was 
rightly eschewed.  
 
This example can be contrasted with what happened during the Korean War. In the 
Senate debate over President Truman’s decision to rush American troops into battle, it 
was stated repeatedly “our sole aim was to drive the North Koreans back to the partition 
line and to restore the status quo ante bellum.”  However this intention was violated 
when, in the immediate aftermath of Macarthur’s triumph at Inchǒn, the American troops 
crossed the 38th parallel,61 which later led to a greater loss of lives as a result of the 
Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Koreans. Walzer sees the Korean case as an 
example of military hubris. This leads to the question whether there can be a purity of 
intention in war.  Walzer doubts it: 
[J]ust wars have political as well as moral reasons – and will have, I 
expect, until the messianic age when justice will be done for its own sake. 
An absolute singular motivation, a pure good will, is a political illusion. 
The case is similar in domestic society, where we take it for granted that 
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parties and movements fighting for civil rights or welfare reform do so 
because their members have certain values and also because they have 
certain ambitions – for power and office, for example. Since they are not 
killing other people, this is easier to accept. But mixed motives are normal 
also in international politics…62  
 
If there is no purity of intention, it becomes difficult to determine when states wage war 
with the right intention, or when it is for self - interest. It becomes more difficult to 
determine to what extent self - interest might be a necessary ingredient of right intention. If 
there is no self interest in the constitution of right intention, how then, as Beach puts it, 
will: 
[P]oliticians in a democracy justify sending young men and women to 
suffer and (possibly) die where no national interest is involved? How 
likely is it that, as the price of success mounts, the political constituency, 
nurtured on television, will lose patience and enforce a humiliating 
withdrawal, leaving things worse than if force had never been used? 
Somalia was a vivid object lesson.63 
 
It was common criticism of western motives in the Gulf war that the price of oil was the 
underlying motive. (Some people can not comprehend why an American soldier will choose to 
die in an Arab soil without any national interest.) This has also been the major critique in the 
on - going Iraqi war.  In Kosovo humanitarian concern for the sufferings of the Albanian 
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inhabitants was clearly the main motive, but the “credibility” of NATO (represented in some 
quarters as American hegemonism) was also at issue. Another consideration was that if 
Milosevic was allowed to have his way in Kosovo it would be the turn of Macedonia next, 
leading to a wider Balkan war; or at least the encouragement of other villains in other places, 
from which NATO nations themselves would be bound in the end to suffer.  
 
Orend, using the example of the Gulf war, raised a related question with regard to the right 
intention. He asked: 
Must moral motivation merely be present in the mix of motives, or need it 
be the main animating force in the mix? Consider for example the mix of 
motives that the allied coalition, led by the United States, might have had 
in 1991 for launching the Persian Gulf War against Iraq: the repulsion of  
Iraq from Kuwait, the punishment of Iraqi aggression, the desire to secure  
the oil supply of the Persian Gulf region, the desire by the United States to 
prove its unsurpassed superiority following the end of the cold war with 
the Soviet Union; and the drive of the American military to test out its 
latest weaponry in real battlefield conditions.64 
 
From the above, there is a serious difficulty in discerning which motive dominates in war 
time. Many will argue that the moral motive, namely the right intention, need only be real 
and present in the mist of other motives. However plausible this may sound, it is less 
interesting.  
                                                 





A frequent criticism of the right intention criterion is that, given the vagueness of intent, 
it is impossible to know whether a state has fulfilled its requirement. Orend, in concurring 
with Walzer, says that the criticism is easily exaggerated. Intention can be and ought to 
be, discerned through a reasoned examination of publicly accessible evidence, relying on 
behavior, consideration of incentives and explicit avowal of intent. Intentions are neither 
infinitely redescribable nor irreducibly private: they are connected to patterns of 
evidence, as well as constrained by norms of logical coherence. Right intention, Orend 
says, is not a vacuous criterion for moral judgement during war. Though difficult, it is 
possible to tell whether a state is prosecuting a war out of ethnic hatred, for example, as 
opposed to vindicating its right of self - defence. The former produces distinctive and 
noticeable results, such as torture, massacres, mass rape campaigns and large scale 
displacements.65  
 
Another deeper question with regard to the criterion of right intention is, given the 
collective nature of states, can we talk of state intention? Do states have intentions? Many 
theorists like Walzer, as seen earlier, will rely on the analogy with the individual citizens. 
However plausible this argument may sound, it is also troublesome. Consider a case 
where a state is waging war, with the approval of fifty percent of its citizens and the other 
fifty percent disapproving of it. Can we then say that the intention of the state is a result 
of the intention of its citizens? 
 
                                                 




I wish to point out the danger that may arise in doubting the possibility of a pure good 
will or a singular motivation from people like Walzer. The danger is a skeptical attitude 
towards state interventions. This skeptical attitude may prevent people from seeing the 
good which the intervening state aims at.  
 
2.4 LAST RESORT 
This criterion holds that a state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, 
peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic 
negotiations. No war should be declared against any nation says Moses Maimonides 
before peace offers are made to it.66 This criterion was the spirit behind article 33 of the 
United Nations charter, which says: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security,  shall first of all seek 
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. This is so, since there is a greater 
merit in preventing war by peaceful negotiation and conciliation than in 
vindicating rights by bloodshed.67 
 
However, if the above measures did not work, in the spirit of the last resort criterion, the 
UN also de-emphasized the immediate use of force. Article 41 goes on to say: 
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Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.    
 
Therefore the rush to send troops to war on the slightest provocation, no matter how 
justified the cause, is condemned. The difficulty with this criterion is the tendency to 
reward aggression by emphasizing a last resort. In the words of Walzer, 
Last resort would make war morally impossible. For we can never reach 
lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it .There is always 
something more to do: another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, 
another meeting. Once something like a blockade is in place, it is always 
possible to wait a little longer and hope for the success of (what looks like 
but isn’t quite) nonviolence.68  
 
However, there is also a danger in accepting the above view of Walzer .The danger is the 
development of a skeptical disposition towards negotiations or mediations. A state 
negotiating with another having this disposition becomes prejudiced, and from the outset 
concludes that the negotiation will not have a natural end, therefore time will be running 
out for justice to be done, since justice delayed may result in justice denied. Using 
                                                 




negotiations or mediations in cases of humanitarian intervention may not sound plausible, 
since this may not solve the root cause of the problem, namely removing the regime 
responsible for the massacre or genocide. Negotiations may temporarily halt the situation 
without providing a lasting solution. 
 
Negotiations, threats and economic sanctions are frequently offered as more compelling 
means of international problem - solving than the use of force. At face value Orend says, 
this claim is indisputable: if a resolution of the crisis in question can be had through a 
credible and permissible threat, or through a negotiating session, or perhaps through 
sanctions, then surely that is preferable than running the sizeable risks of war. However, 
he says, “much depends on the nature of the particular act of aggression and the nature of 
the aggressive regime itself. Sometimes threats diplomacy and sanctions will not work.”69 
James Mayall concurs: 
Recollected in tranquility, an abstract problem in international relations, 
the continued willingness of governments to employ economic sanctions 
in international disputes is undoubtedly puzzling. The conventional 
wisdom after all is that they do not work. Since 1945 they have been 
repeatedly imposed by individual states, by alliances, by regional 
organizations and by the United Nations itself. Virtually no case have they 
been unambiguously successful.70 
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Mayall gave four examples, namely the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979, the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979-80, the imposition of martial law in 
Poland in December 1981, and the Argentinean invasion of Falkland Islands in April 
1982.In all the four cases, he concluded that: 
[S]keptical argument was vigorously deployed by interested parties on all 
sides, in two of them at least, possibly three, it seems likely that in terms 
of the declared objectives of the sanctions to get the Soviet Union out of 
Afghanistan, to restore human and civil rights in Poland, to secure the 
release of the American hostages, historians will conclude that the 
conventional skepticism was broadly vindicated.71 
 
People like Mayall express skepticism towards sanctions because of what they see as the 
standard academic requirement for the success of sanctions. For sanctions to be effective, 
it generally requires a universal application and a high degree of dependence in the target 
state. They believe that although sanctions raise costs for the target state, the increase is 
seldom sufficient to purchase compliance and the costs are often greater for the country 
imposing the sanctions. Sanctions produce perverse effects, which means that despite 
raising costs for the target state, it creates, on the one hand, out of the siege mentality a 
sense of national cohesion and determination to triumph in adversity that was previously 
lacking, while on the other hand it divides the sanctioning nation within itself and from 
its allies. 
 
                                                 




Another problem with blockades and sanctions, as many authors72 pointed out, is that 
they violate the principle of non-combatant immunity.  Often it is innocent civilians, 
mostly poor and vulnerable ones, who bear the brunt of sanctions and economic 
embargoes. Outlaw regimes and those in authority often find ways to take care of 
themselves within their own borders or through their allies. 
 
It then seems much more plausible, as Orend points out, to argue, “not that war must be 
the literal last resort after all other means have been exhausted but rather that states ought 
not to be hasty in their resort to force.”73 But beyond this general principle, concrete 
details of the actual situation in question should be of major focus. For example, when 
the aggressor is mounting a swift and brutal invasion, one should respond effectively 
before all is lost. It is also necessary to consider the nature of the territory of the victim of 
aggression. If it is a tiny country like Israel or say Singapore, the need for a speedy and 
effective response against aggression will probably be much greater than that required by 
a country the size and strength of the United States.74 
 
2.5 PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 
This Just War criterion concurs with commonsense knowledge. It will be foolhardiness if 
a state engages in a huge risk of war that may turn out to be futile. Therefore this criterion 
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emphasizes that arms must not be used when their use is futile. A state may not resort to 
war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. This 
criterion introduces a crucial point: that the practicality of what is proposed is a key 
element in formulating an ethical judgement. However just the cause, it is wrong to use 
military action that is likely to fail. To say this is not to set pragmatism above morality, 
but to recognize an essential ingredient in moral judgement itself. If what is proposed will 
not work, then however lofty the motive, the proposal must be rejected. 
 
However, one cannot claim that military forecasts are infallible, “the military are often 
wrong on strictly military matters; how else can one account for the fact, in all the wars 
of history roughly 50% of the generals have been losers?”75 Actually, the vicissitudes of 
war are, as we know from history, among the most difficult phenomena to predict. Even 
when the odds have seen incredibly long, remarkable successes have sometimes 
somehow been achieved. Such are the stuff of military legends.76 
 
A real danger that emanates from this criterion is the danger of false optimism. This 
stems from the opacity of the future, and the optimistic illusions that this opacity allows. 
These illusions lead states to fight in the false hope of victory or for pyrrhic victories. 
False hopes of wartime victory raise the risk of war in two ways; first, such hopes lead 
losers to join wars they could avoid if they foresaw their defeat. War is a trial of strength. 
If its results were foretold, the weaker could yield to the stronger and achieve the same 
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results without suffering the pain of war,77 but often, relative strength cannot be measured 
without a battlefield test. If States agree on their relative power, this test is unnecessary, 
but if they disagree, a contest of arms can offer the only way to persuade the weaker side 
that it is the weaker and must concede. Secondly, false hopes of wartime victory lead 
states to join more crises and to drive these crises over the brink more often. Optimistic 
states join crises more boldly and conduct them more recklessly because they are more 
willing to risk the war that a crisis could spawn. They also join crises from false hopes 
that the other side will concede (“they know they are too weak to confront us, so they will 
fold”), giving them a peaceful victory, then dismiss the adversary’s real threat as bluff 
(“They know they will lose a fight, so their threat to fight must be empty”), push the 
crises too far, and trigger inadvertent war. 
 
History attests to this issue of false optimism. A British officer declared Germany would 
be an “easy prey” for Britain and France.78  Similar illusions prevailed before World War 
II. Japanese planners disdained Chinese military capabilities before launching their 1937 
invasion of China. The Japanese army boasted that it could defeat China in three months 
with no more than five divisions.79  The Japanese army minister forecast that “we will 
send large forces, smash them in a hurry and get the whole thing over with quickly,” and 
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even claimed that the army will conquer China in less than a month.80 But China was still 
not subdued when Japan surrendered in 1945. 
 
Hitler held the Soviet Union in contempt and expected easy victory over Soviet forces in 
1941. After crushing France he told German officers that “a campaign against Russia 
would be like a child’s game in a sand box by comparison” and that “we have only to 
kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.”81 Hitler also 
dismissed American military power: the United States, he believed, was a “ decayed 
country”82 incapable of waging war83, therefore he dismissed the danger that the U.S 
intervention would pose and the likelihood that it would occur, arguing in 1938 that the 
United States was too weak to dare going beyond empty gestures in international affairs. 
The only hope of America as Hitler saw it lay in the German element that might some 
day take over. “The German component of the American people will be the source of its 
political and mental resurrection.”84 Hitler’s optimistic illusion was his doom. Little did 
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he know that the Americans will soon join the war which will mark an end to both his 
quest for European domination and even his life. 
 
Probability of success is not a mathematical desideratum; war situations cannot be easily 
predicted. However great care need to be exercised that probability of success, like last 
resort, does not amount to rewarding aggression, and especially by larger and more 
powerful nations. This is so because smaller and weaker nations will face a 
comparatively harder task when it comes to fulfilling this criterion. Despite this 
difficulty, Walzer suggests that there are considerations of self respect here, according to 
which victims of aggression ought to be permitted at least some resistance, should they 
decide on it, as an expression of their strong objection to the aggression and as 
affirmation of their rights. Though Walzer’s suggestion remains plausible, it is important 
that states contemplating war in response to aggression still consider whether such an 
extreme measure has any reasonable probability of success. 
 
2.6 PROPORTIONALITY 
This criterion is one of the most contentious and challenging Jus ad bellum criteria. It 
mandates that a state considering launching a just war must weigh the expected universal 
benefits of doing so against the expected universal costs. Only if the projected benefits, in 
terms of securing the just cause, are at least equal to and preferably greater than such 




If governments had crystal balls that revealed the future, they would fight only wars that 
improved their situation, and since few wars improve things for both sides, wars will be 
scarce. The costs of wars are so enormous that some people will argue that nothing will 
balance the loss of lives and guilty feelings that result in war. Consider the following 
from Erasmus: 
Think…of all the crimes that are committed with war as a pretext while 
‘good laws fall silent amid the clash of arms’- all the instances of sack and 
sacrilege, rape and other shameful acts, such as one hesitates  even to 
name .And even when the war is over ,this moral corruption is bound to 
linger for many years. Now assess for me the cost- a cost so great that, 
even if you win the war, you will lose much more than you gain. Indeed 
what realm…can be weighed against the life, the blood, of so many 
thousand men.85   
 
The opacity of the future also makes it difficult for the cost and benefit calculation 
demanded by this criterion. Walzer pointed out that “most of the time, we can make only 
short term predictions, and we have no way that even mimics the mathematics of 
comparing the costs of fighting to the costs of not fighting, since one set of cost is 
necessarily speculative, while the other comes in, as it were over an indeterminate time 
span.”86 How do we weigh the universal costs and benefits against each other when, 
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usually during war, those who pay the costs are not the same group who enjoy the 
benefits, such as when soldiers pay the present price for the future independence of their 
fellow country men? The calculations needed are simply too complex and wide - ranging. 
It is widely improbable that we could ever devise a completely satisfying set of cost-
benefit formulae with regard to wartime action. 
 
However, the issue of proportionality can be viewed from the perspective of values. How 
valuable is the thing threatened by aggression, that states will be willing to sacrifice the 
lives of their citizens for? It becomes pertinent, that “if force is to be used to protect 
values, it is not trivia that are to be protected but values of fundamental worth.”87 This 
quickly leads to another issue, namely the valuation of values. How do we rank values in 
relation to human life? What are the scales for measuring these values? Walzer   
recognized this problem by asking rhetorically, “how do we measure a country’s 
independence against the value of the lives that might be lost defending it? How do we 
figure in the value of defeating an aggressive regime or the value of deterring other 
similar regimes?”88 All values of this latter sort Walzer says are likely to lose out to the 
body count, since it is only bodies that can be counted. And then it becomes impossible to 
fight any wars, except those that promise to be bloodless, and not only on one side. This 
last  is an entirely respectable position - Pacifism, not just war - but anyone holding it 
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Walzer says has to recognize and accept the non - pacific results of trying to 
accommodate aggressive states and regimes.89 
  
Some Utilitarians like Mill will opine that personal safety is not the highest of values. 
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and 
degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which think nothing worth a 
war, is worse ….A man who has nothing which he cares about than he 
does about his personal safety is a miserable creature who has no chance 
of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than 
himself.90  
Mill in this context alludes to the values from which he speaks, but the salient fact about 
this statement is his ranking of relative values. He does not deny the value of personal 
safety; yet it is not for him the highest value. He does not deny the ugliness of war; he 
only affirms that in ranking of priorities it is not the worst evil.  
 
However, if states were to continue the cost-benefit calculations they may end up 
rewarding aggression or remain at the level of excessive idealism. It is quite plausible to 
agree with Turner who pointed out the necessity of being realistic towards values. He 
said: 
[P]ersonal security, justice, freedom and domestic peace …are not to be 
dismissed lightly by reference to a utopian vision in which these and other 
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values would all be present in greater measure .We must always as moral 
beings, measure reality against our ideals; yet to reject the penultimate 
goods secured by the real because they do not measure up to the ultimate 
goods envisioned in the ideal is to ensure the loss of even the penultimate 
goods that we now enjoy. The ultimate would certainly be better; yet in 
the mean time, we have the obligation to hold as fast as possible to the 
value at hand, even though doing so must inevitably incur costs.91 
  
The proportionality criterion, despite the difficulties it entails, points to obvious 
considerations of prudence and utility as limiting conditions on the pursuit of rights-
respecting justice in war time. Proportionality at best provides some checks and balances, 
some outside constraints on the drive to secure a just cause. For example, even though 
justice may have permitted otherwise, it was appropriate on the grounds of 
proportionality that the United States did not go to war against the Soviet Union after the 
latter invaded Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968.92  
 
Just War Theory insists that all the six criteria must  be fulfilled for a particular 
declaration of war to be justified; it is all or no justification. This requirement, many 
argue, makes Just War Theory quite demanding, while others on the contrary hold that it 
should be quite demanding given the gravity of its subject matter. It is important to note 
that the first three of these six criteria are what we might call deontological requirements, 
otherwise known as duty - based or first - principle requirements. For a war to be just, 
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some core duty must be violated by the other side: in this case the duty not to commit 
aggression. A war in punishment of this violated duty must itself respect further duties: it 
must be appropriately motivated, and must be publicly declared by the proper authority. 
The next three requirements are consequentialist: given that these first - principle 
requirements have been met, the expected consequences of launching the war must be 
considered. Therefore the Jus ad bellum principles are the combination of deontology and 
consequentialism. 
        
Just War Theory is originally a theory of defensive war. Defensive not in the sense as 
opposed to offensive war, since the act of war must necessarily involve offensive actions. 
Rather, defensive in the sense that it is a war that must be waged because of a wrong 
received. However, the recent event, namely the war in Iraq, has provoked another view 
of war that has been more dormant among war theorists. Here I am referring to the ideas 
of preventative and preemptive war. The question will then be, are there elements in the 
Just War tradition that referred to preemptive and preventative war? 
 
Preemptive war simply means a war waged in response to a perceived imminent attack, 
in order not to be the loser in the attack. On May 14, 1967, Egypt sent forces across the 
Suez Canal and into the Sinai desert, triggering a crisis with Israel that ended in war on 
June 5. During this crisis, Israeli officials feared an imminent Arab attack, and they 
correctly thought the side striking first would have a great advantage. These perceptions 
fueled an urge to preempt that shaped Israel’s conduct in the crisis. As the crisis 
intensified, Israeli military leaders pressed for war on grounds that Israel could strike a 
  
47 
decisive blow if it hit first, and risked a damaging Arab first strike if it waited.93   
Characteristics of preemptive war include deception and surprise. This was seen in the 
Israeli preemptive strike against Egypt. After reaching a provisional decision for war, 
Israel adopted a studied nonchalance to lull Egypt into unwatchfulness. Israeli troops 
were released on leave, and two days before Israel struck. Israel also covered its plans for 
surprise attack in secrecy, leaving Egypt blind to the devastating blow Israel would 
strike.94 
 
Preventative war, on the other hand, is a war that is waged in order to avoid the balance 
of power tipping in favour of an enemy state. Preventative war is justified by fear alone 
and not by anything other states do or any signs they give of their malign intention.95 In a 
preventative war, a state launches an early war before the power shift is complete, either 
to avoid a later war waged under worse conditions,96 or to avoid later being compelled to 
bargain from weakness.97 The typical preventative logic is “we must fight before we 
weaken.” Thucydides argued that the Peloponnesian war was at root preventative: “What 
made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this caused in 
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Sparta.”98 Israel struck Egypt in 1955 to forestall a leap in Egypt’s military strength 
following a large 1955 Czech- Egyptian arms deal, and to exploit a rare fleeting 
opportunity to fight with Britain and France as allies.99  
 
In spite of the differences between preemptive and preventative war, it has to be 
acknowledged that the distinction is blurred in some circumstances. Modern weaponry 
has developed in such a way that weapons can be used immediately they are acquired. It 
can only take minutes or hours for a rocket launcher to drop bombs on cities, and the 
enormous consequences of emerging weapons like atomic and hydrogen bombs make it 
difficult to wait for signs of preemption before an enemy state can be attacked. Walzer 
mentions the case of Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 as an example 
where the gap between preemption and prevention is narrowed. “The Iraqi threat was not 
imminent, but an immediate attack was the only reasonable action against it. Once the 
reactor was in operation, an attack would have endangered civilians living many miles 
around it. So it was a question of now or never.”100 
 
A preemptive war must satisfy the conditions that have been set out in the Just War 
Theory. Over and above the satisfaction of Just War conditions, any justification for a 
preemptive war must show that there is a “manifest intent to injure, a degree of active 
preparations that makes the intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which 
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waiting or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”101 These 
conditions spelt out by Walzer can be cashed out in something like a visible mobilization 
of armies, navies and air forces. On the other hand, boastful ranting of political leaders 
and unsubstantiated provocations cannot be seen as reasons for preemptive wars. 
 
From the above I will then look at the United States’ invasion of Iraq. The first problem 
of the Iraqi war stems from its justification. President Bush conflates the idea of 
terrorism, preventative and preemptive war. At one time he refers to terrorism and the 
imperative of ridding the world of evil or axis of evil. In the 2002 State of the Union 
address, he singled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil. At other times he 
talks about preemption. In an address to the graduating class of West Point Military 
Academy, he said: 
If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too 
long…Deterrence - the promise of massive retaliation against nations - 
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or 
citizens to defend…we must be ready for a preemptive action when 
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.102 
The above statements were made with Iraq in mind, and were followed by the invasion of 
Iraq. However, despite the conflation of preemption, prevention and terrorism, the 
invasion of Iraq remains a preventative war.  
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There has not been any substantial evidence that links Iraq or the Hussein regime to Al-
Qaeda or any terrorism organization; therefore no justification can be offered that the 
Iraqi war is a war on terror. Again, by seeing Iraq as part of the axis of evil and by 
accepting the imperative to root out evil, President Bush committed a fallacy, by thinking 
that the United States can uproot evil in the world. As Shaun Casey puts it, “the 
invocation of ridding the world of evil is a grave theological as well as political error. No 
programme and no war can rid the world of evil.”103 On another hand, America was not 
under any direct, grave or imminent threat from Iraq.  Therefore, there was no 
justificatory reason for a preemptive war. 
 
The Iraqi war is a preventative war, a war that arose from the unfounded fear that Iraq 
may acquire nuclear weapons to augument its power, and subsequently attack the United 
States or compete with it. The Bush administration then thought it expedient to stop Iraq 
before it acquires the said weapon. For as President Bush said: 
Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our 
world is not….America has, and intends to keep, military strengths 
beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms race of other eras 
pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.104 
 
Preventative war on its own cannot find any justification in the Just War Theory or in 
international law. Normalizing preventative war as in the case of Iraq will have a 
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catastrophic consequence in the world. China can invoke the doctrine of preventative war 
to attack Taiwan if they perceive any move by Taiwan to augument its military strength, 
especially now that the United States is suggesting a military package for Taiwan. India 
and Pakistan can also do the same, as well as North and South Korea. Again, if 
preventative war is justified in the case of Iraq, then it must be justified in similar 
circumstances involving other states.  
 
Granted for the sake of argument that the Iraqi war is being fought to compel Iraq to obey 
the UN resolution on arms proliferation, it then becomes ironic because the United States 
went to war without the approval of the UN. Therefore it lacked the legitimate authority 
to prosecute the war. If Iraq has violated the resolution of the United Nations, the onus 
lies with the UN to compel Iraq to obey the rules. 
  
Stretching the argument further, if Iraq has violated the UN resolution, did it reach a 
stage where war became the last option? I argued that it did not, since the UN through its 
agency namely the I.A.E.A (International Atomic Energy Agency) was still carrying out 
inspections in Iraq. Given the violation of the Jus ad bellum principles of just cause and 
legitimate authority, the United States cannot claim to have any right intention in the war 
against Iraq.  Therefore the war in Iraq is an unjust war, since it violates the just war 
principles, and it cannot claim to be a preemptive war because it does not meet the 





                            CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
3.0 JUS IN BELLO 
Jus in bello refers to justice in war, to the right conduct in the midst of battle. Just War 
Theory insists that there be consistency with regard to means and end in war. It is not 
enough to have a just cause, or to satisfy the criteria set out by Jus ad bellum;  it is also 
necessary to fight rightly in war. 
 
There are many criteria that jus in bello sets out that must be satisfied if a war is to be 
fought in the right and proper manner. They include non-combatant immunity, 
proportionality, no means mala in se, obedience to all international laws on weapon 
prohibition, benevolent quarantine of prisoners of war, and no reprisals. I will discuss 
these criteria. However, it is pertinent to point out that the above criteria are required to 
limit warfare, to prevent it from spilling over into an ever-escalating, and increasingly 
destructive, experiment in total warfare. If just wars are limited wars designed to secure 
their just causes with only proportionate force, then there is a need for rules of restraints 
in wartime. 
 
3.1 NON COMBATANT IMMUNITY 
According to Clausewitz, the essence of war is to force our enemy to do our will, in the 
case of a just war to force the aggressor to do our will, namely to withdraw the 
aggression. This act of forcing then manifests itself in killing. However, Just War Theory 
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insists that not every member of the aggressor state is liable to be killed. It makes a 
distinction between combatants, who are liable to be killed, and non-combatants who 
should not be killed. The question will then be, who is a combatant and who is not? In 
making the distinction, Daniel Zupan holds that a combatant is one who has adopted a 
maxim that aims at harming us, against which the use of force is justified, while a non- 
combatant is one who has not adopted such a maxim.105 Nagel on his own part made the 
distinction based on the immediacy of harm. He said: 
So we must distinguish combatants from non – combatants on the basis of 
their immediate threat or harmfulness… children are not combatants even 
though they may join the armed forces if they are allowed to grow up. 
Women are not combatants just because they bear children or offer 
comfort to the soldiers.106 
 
It then means that all non-harming persons or institutions are immune from direct and 
intentional attack in the battlefield. Vitoria explicitly described those who should be 
considered innocent during a war: they include women and children, foreigners and 
travellers, harmless agricultural folk and the rest of the civilian population.107 Wounded 
soldiers or combatants are also included in this category, since the wounded soldier is no 
longer a threat, nor is he engaged in harming us. Why are these people considered 
innocent? Vitoria says, because they have not committed any injurious act. But, though 
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presumed innocent, when they engage in actual fighting, they forfeit their privileged 
status.108 
 
From a Christian perspective, Paul Ramsey locates the immunity of non-combatants in 
the concept of Christian love. He holds that Christian love often acts within the law and 
lays down rules or principles for the guidance of action. Christian love often determines 
what should be done in situations not rightly covered by the law, by natural justice, or 
even by its own former articulation. Therefore when Christians affirm that the right 
conduct of war can never include the strategic bombing of whole civilian populations and 
that it is never right to intend to kill directly millions of babies and school children in 
order to get at their fathers, the reason is not that they adopt a rigorous alien natural law 
principle drawn from some source outside of Christian morals, but that they find 
themselves still required to do only what love requires and permitted.  “In determining 
justifiable and unjustifiable warfare, the work of love will be to return ever again to the 
prohibition of the direct killing of any person not directly or closely co-operating in the 
force which should be resisted.”109 Ramsey therefore presupposes that unjust aggressors 
from the law of love should be repelled, which may result in killing them, but love also 
insists that only those who must be repelled should be targeted.110 
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Combatants, on the other hand, are targets to be killed. They represent the aggressor that 
must be forced to submit to our will. Combatants are normally equated but not restricted 
to soldiers. Soldiers pose immediate threats in the battlefield since they are trained to kill. 
In being trained to kill, on the other hand, they acquire the status that marks them out for 
killing. Walzer holds that soldiers lose their right to life by fighting in a war. 
 
He puts it thus: 
The immediate problem is that the soldiers who do the fighting, though 
they can rarely be said to have chosen to fight, lose the rights they are 
supposedly defending. They gain war rights as combatants and potential 
prisoners, but they can now be attacked and killed at will by their 
enemies. Simply by fighting, whatever their private hopes and 
intentions, they have lost their title to life and liberty, and they have lost 
it even though, unlike aggressor states, they have committed no crime.111 
 
The above distinction of combatants and non- combatants is not devoid of problems. The 
problem can be said to be two - pronged. On the one hand is the problem of the 
distinction, and on the other hand is the difficulty of maintaining the distinction in the 
actual battlefield, and given modern technology associated with war. I will now turn to 
these problems.  
 
First among the problems is the distinction itself. The morality of the battlefield 
distinguishes not between the innocent and the guilty, but between combatants and non-
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combatants. Combatants however cannot be equated with the morally guilty, since 
opposing combatants are likely to have valid claims to moral innocence. Neither has 
wronged the other or any one else. But each is licensed, legally and morally, to try to 
injure or kill the other. 
 
The next problem with regard to the distinction pertains to the communal dimension of 
war.  War can be likened to an economic activity in which many hands work to sustain. 
Therefore the heroic spectacle of men contending on a darkling plain is a system that is 
sustained and promoted by the efforts of millions of ordinary persons - from taxpayers 
and defence workers to comfortably isolated functionaries in air-conditioned missile 
silos, even religious adherents. Parents pray for their children before they leave for battle, 
some provide theirs with amulets and protective charms. 
 
The Second World War provides a historical example. In Moscow the atheist Stalin came 
openly before the Russian people and spoke not of revolution or of communism or of 
Marx, but of Mother Russia; the churches were opened and in the atheistic state there 
were public prayers for the homeland. This single act went a long way to show the 
relationship between citizenry and military in a modern war.112  Similarly, although Paris, 
in the First World War, was not under siege, Parisians thought it would be and taxicab 
drivers bravely drove the soldiers stationed to defend the city to the exposed right flank 
facing the south - turning Germans.113  In this communal dimension of war, civilians 
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became a part of the war effort in ways, both actual and symbolic, that undermine any 
sharp distinction between combatants and non-combatants. 
 
This communal dimension of war has consequently generated problems for Just War 
Theory. Some writers have now tried to extend the class of combatants. For instance 
Oppenheim argues that although the new developments in warfare cannot be deemed to 
have affected the validity of the general principle of immunity of non-combatants from 
direct attack, sections of the civilian population, like munition workers which are closely 
identified with military objectives proper, may, while so identified, be legitimately 
exposed to air attack and to other belligerent measures.114 In the same line, Spaight 
concludes: 
International law must move with the times. It must accept the truth that 
the old clear-cut division of enemy individuals into combatants and non-
combatants is no longer…without some qualifications. It must recognize 
…that there is now an intermediate class; the class of armament workers 
…Its approximation to the combatant class has been affirmed by   Rolland 
and some other jurists but this is not as yet generally understood and finds 
no expression in the formal international law which is embodied in 
conventions.115 
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This problem of extension of classes poses a big problem for Just War Theory; if the 
class of combatants is extended, then it may continue to expand till the distinction 
becomes meaningless. Walzer recognized this difficulty in extending the combatant 
status beyond the class of soldiers, which he thinks is a problem generated by the 
development of military technology. He writes: 
The development of military technology, it might be said, has dictated it, 
for war today is as much an economic as a military activity. Vast numbers 
of workers must be mobilized before an army can even appear in the field; 
and once they are engaged, soldiers are radically dependent on a 
continuing stream of equipment, fuel, ammunition, food, and so on. It is a 
great temptation then to attack the enemy army behind its own lines, 
especially if the battle itself is not going well. But to attack behind the 
lines is to make war against people who are at least nominally civilians. 
How can this be justified?116 
This communual dimension of war has also prompted Orwell to argue that such rule as 
civilian or non-combatant immunity is “sheer humbug.” He could not see why it was 
worse to kill civilians than to kill soldiers. While “legitimate” warfare kills “the 
healthiest and bravest of young male population,” a bomb dropped on a city kills a 
cross - section of the population – a preferable outcome, in Orwell’s judgement, 
because: 
War is not avoidable at this stage of history and since it has to happen it 
does not seem to me a bad thing that others should be killed besides young 
                                                 




men. I wrote in 1937 “Sometimes it is a comfort to me to think that the 
aeroplane is altering the conditions of war. Perhaps when the next war 
comes we may see that sight unprecedented in all history, a jingo with a 
bullet hole in him”. We haven’t seen that yet […] but at any rate the 
suffering of this war has been shared out more evenly than the last one 
was. The immunity of civilians, one of the things that have made war 
possible has been shattered.[…]I don’t regret that. I cant feel that war is 
“humanized” by being confined to the slaughter of the young and becomes 
“barbarous” when the old get killed as well.[…]War is only of its nature 
barbarous, it is better to admit that. If we see ourselves as the savages we 
are, some improvement is possible […]117 
As Primoratz pointed out, Orwell’s argument is one of distributive justice.118 At this stage 
of history, war is inevitable. It is therefore better, more just, that the suffering it brings 
should be distributed more evenly, rather than inflicted for the most part on healthy 
young men in the field. 
 
In looking for a way to wriggle out of this problem of extension and distribution created 
by the communal dimension of war, Just War Theory holds that there must be a 
distinction between those who make what soldiers need to fight, and what they need to 
live like all of us. Though many will argue that the farmer who is working for the 
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soldier’s stomach is strengthening him for war, Just War Theory will affirm that the 
farmer’s role bears no necessary connection to the war effort, only a contingent one. The 
function of the farmer, unlike the general who command the war, is separable from the 
waging of war.119 It is therefore wrong, as Nagel said, to direct an attack against those 
who merely serve the combatants’ need as human beings, such as farmers and food 
suppliers, even though survival as a human being is a necessary condition of efficient 
functioning of a soldier.120 Just War Theory will also maintain that even if civilians are 
enthusiastic supporters of their government’s war, even if they wish the enemy ill, this 
sort of ideological commitment does not justify the use of force against them.121   
 
Let us grant that the distinction between non-combatants and combatants holds. A new 
problem surfaces namely: the adherence to the normative requirements of this distinction 
in actual battle. Wars as we know have largely been fought by conscript armies. 
Conscription makes vivid the contemporary ethical context of soldiering: combatants 
typically take up the military burden because they have to. That compulsion is likely to 
rest on physical, political and legal considerations. The soldier’s ethos uses the language 
of political patriotism, of doing one’s duty, of obeying the law, and most importantly, of 
confronting uncontrollable circumstances.122 The combatant’s primary concern is the 
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survival of himself and his friends. This can best be captured in the words of Michael 
Gelven when he said: 
Some are only seventeen; many are even less than that. Their khaki 
uniforms and steel helmets and high-laced boots appear as mockeries to 
their innocence. In their young and skilled hands they hold terrible 
weapons designed to send awesome destructions over great distances 
against targets that are known as the enemy , often boys as young as they, 
boys whose names they do not know ….For the gathered host only one 
thing matters: victory. That is how they see things: victory or defeat. No 
other value seems to matter to them, not even their own. To achieve 
victory is everything; to suffer defeat is the only failure.123  
 
Combatants are constrained by forces and circumstances that determine what they must 
do. They tend to be young, with little opportunity to develop an educated opinion. Thus 
the adherence to the normative requirements of the combatant and non - combatant 
distinction may make no sense to them. What they only have in mind is the concept of the 
enemy; anybody from the opposite end is conclusively an enemy and should be 
eliminated. Belief in the justice of their cause is likely to be shaped by propaganda, not 
deliberation. In some cases - certainly in the case of child soldiers - the combatant is yet 
another victim of the regime in power, rather than a participant in that regime. 
 
Another factor that militates against not harming non - combatant is the development of 
modern warfare. Modern warfare compounds the vulnerability of non - combatants. Wars 
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are no longer conceived as soldiers on horsebacks or ground troops rushing to meet their 
enemies; aerial bombardment has become the order of the day. This form of warfare is 
probably the one that affects non-combatants mostly. The other forms of warfare, like 
ground troop deployment and submarine attacks, by their nature are directed principally 
against combatants, and in most cases directly affect only a relatively small portion of the 
non-combatants in a belligerent state. The development of aerial bombardment, however, 
has made it possible to bring the war into the back yards of many millions of civilians 
and it is in this kind of warfare that the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants become at least of no practical significance.124  
 
Often munition factories, defence ministries and barracks are in close proximity to 
civilian residence, schools and hospitals, and in the bid to destroy them normally by 
aerial bombardment, innocent civilians are sometimes unintentionally injured or killed. 
The greatest difficulty with regard to the requirement not to harm or kill non - combatants 
is the fact that combatants often use civilians as shelters or camouflage amidst civilians, 
especially in guerilla wars. Proximity and scarcity then make both combatant and non-
combatant equally vulnerable. In this kind of situation from a moral point of view that 
adheres strictly to the maintenance of non-combatant immunity, “war can then no longer 
be fought because it is no longer an anti-guerilla but an anti- social war, a war against an 
entire people in which no distinction will be possible in the actual fighting.”125 
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Again, Just War Theory has tried to wrestle with the problem of civilian casualties in 
war.  It recognizes and affirms that, given the nature of war, civilians or non- combatants 
are often endangered not because any one sets out to attack them, but only because of 
their proximity to a battle that is being fought against someone else. 
 
Traditionally Just War Theory has appealed to the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to 
justify the unintended harm that comes to victims from the legitimate use of force during 
war. Double effect is a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking non-
combatants with the legitimate conduct of military activity. The argument of double 
effect holds that it is permitted to perform an act likely to have an evil consequence 
(killing of non-combatants) provided the following conditions are met: 
 
(1)  The act is good in itself or at least morally indifferent, which means that it is a 
legitimate act of war. 
(2)  The direct effect is morally acceptable - the destruction of military supplies or the 
killing of the enemy soldiers. 
(3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the 
evil effect is not one of his ends nor is it a means to his end. 
(4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect.126  
 
Therefore following this rule of double effect, Just War Theory acknowledges the 
casualties that involve civilians, who are unintended, side effects of war. However, in 
                                                 




certain difficult situations Just War Theory has sought to give a guideline using the 
above-mentioned principle of double effect. As Walzer outlined, 
Civilians had to be hit before soldiers could be hit and this kind of attack 
is morally unacceptable. A soldier must take careful aim at his military 
target and away from nonmilitary targets. He can only shoot if he has a 
reasonable clear shot; he can only attack if a direct attack is possible. He 
can risk incidental deaths, but he can not kill civilians simply because he 
finds them between himself and his enemies.127    
From Walzer’s statement, it then means that soldiers should attack when there is any 
legitimate reason to attack, making the action a legitimate act of war. However, incidental 
deaths may occur, but soldiers should not attack civilians directly. Civilians therefore do 
not forfeit their right of immunity just because soldiers choose to camouflage within 
them. 
 
Another attempt to maintain the rule of non-combatant immunity is the issuance of 
warning prior to any attack on any place soldiers are in proximity with civilians. This 
single act, as Zupan argues, will give civilians the option of not going into harm’s way, 
instead of involuntarily incorporating them into hell.128  This strategy in fact is a part of 
the military policies of some states. The United States Field Manual (The law of the Land 
Warfare)  27-10, vividly states:  
 
 
                                                 
127 Ibid., p.174. 
 




The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a 
bombardment except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the 
authorities. 
B   
This rule is understood to refer only to bombardments of places where 
parts of the civilian population remain. 
C 
Even when belligerents are not subject to the above treaty, the 
commanders of United States ground forces will, when the situation 
permits, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that 
the non-combatants, especially women and children, may be removed 
before the bombardment commences. 
 
There is however another situation which Just War theorists like Michael Walzer say 
might justify killing non - combatants. He calls it “supreme emergency.”129 This refers to 
a fate worse than death. A supreme emergency exists when our deepest values and our 
collective survival are in imminent danger. It is, 
When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial 
extension or governmental structure or prestige or honour, but in what we 
might think of as its ongoingness, then we face a loss that is greater than 
any we can imagine, except for the destruction of humanity itself. We face 
                                                 




moral as well as physical extinction, the way of life as well as a set of 
particular lives, the disappearance of people like us. And it is then that we 
may be driven to break through the moral limits that people like us 
normally attend to and respect.130 
   
Supreme emergency concerns the situation when people are faced with imminent 
defeat by the type of horrible threat posed by Nazi Germany. It is this type of danger 
Walzer says that will justify over riding the rights of non-combatants. He holds that: 
Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an 
ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to 
those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were 
literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful. We see it – and I don’t 
use the phrase lightly – as evil objectified in the world and in a form so 
potent and apparent that there could never have been anything to do but 
fight against it.131  
Walzer however cautioned that if we are to adopt or defend the adoption of extreme 
methods that involve targeting non-combatants, the danger must be an unusual and 
horrifying kind,132 which Nazism represents. He also emphasized that a supreme 
emergency exists when there is proof of a close, potent and imminent threat of losing 
sovereignty and integrity and then being subjected to widespread massacre or 
                                                 
130  M. Walzer, Arguing about War,   p.43. 
 






enslavement.133  This caveat is necessary to avoid a trivializing of the state of supreme 
emergency, since commanders can easily conceive a threatening situation of defeat as a 
supreme emergency. We should be very reluctant to grant such exemptions.134 Another 
thing worth mentioning, he says, is that only just states may avail themselves of the 
supreme emergency escape clause; which means only states that have met jus ad bellum 
principles may invoke the idea of supreme emergency. 
 
Just War Theory would allow civilian casualties in war by either resorting to the doctrine of 
double effect (DDE) or by invoking what Walzer refers to as supreme emergency. These 
two ideas are not devoid of problems. Their problems are outside the scope of this thesis. 
But it will be pertinent to point out that given the vagueness and difficulty of assessing 
intentions, one may not know when soldiers are targeting civilians directly and when they 
are following the doctrine of double effect. On the other hand, as Coady pointed out, 
supreme emergency “undervalues the depth and centrality of the prohibition on killing the 
innocent.”135 The prohibition on the direct and intentional killing of innocent people should 
not merely be located in the war convention, as Walzer did. Rather, it functions in our 
moral thinking as a sort of touchstone of moral and intellectual health. “To suspend this, 
because of necessity or supreme emergency, is to bring about an upheaval in the moral 
perspective.”136  
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However, another problem is that of the innocent threat.137 Innocent threat exists when, 
given the condition of war, a soldier uses civilians as a direct shield from which he attacks. 
In a situation like this, one cannot invoke the doctrine of double effect in order to attack the 
soldier. Any attack on the soldier will be first of all a conscious and direct attack on the 
civilian or civilians being used as shield or shields. On the other hand, this case cannot be 
seen as a case of supreme emergency. Just War Theory therefore must evolve ways of 
solving this particular problem. 
 
Nevertheless, civilians face extreme dangers especially due to the modern technology of 
warfare, despite the acknowledgement of the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants in war. I agree thus with Nurick: 
How then is the noncombatant immune from attack? He is legally subject 
to almost unrestricted artillery and naval bombardment. If he lives in a 
besieged locality he may legally be starved or bombed. If he lives in a 
country which does not grow enough food to support its population, a 
blockade can legally starve him to death. If he lives in an important city, 
he is subject to bomb and robot attack of the most catastrophic nature. 
Truly in many cases he may not be the intended subject of attack, but 
under modern methods of waging war that gives him little protection. 
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Where does this leave the “fundamental” doctrine that a non – combatant 
is relatively immune from attack?138   
 
I acknowledge the difficulties in the distinction of combatant and non -combatants, both 
from the point of view of the idea itself, and from the point of view of applying it in 
actual situations of war. However, difficult as it is, there is still a distinction in many 
cases. To take an extreme case, there is no doubt that if an aviator strafed children in a 
kindergarten, he would be guilty of a war crime. On the other hand, the bombing of a 
military base is unquestionably legal. 
 
3.2 PROPORTIONALITY 
This criterion aims at limiting the excessive means that states may use in the attempt to 
secure the just cause. The right to wage a war does not guarantee the right to use 
excessive means in achieving the aim of such a war. Soldiers therefore may only use 
proportional force in a just war, since just wars are limited wars. This will ensure a 
balance between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives.  
 
Since the entry into force of protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949, 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, the principle of 
proportionality has become a pillar in the law of armed conflicts.   However, the attempt 
to implement the principle of proportionality in international law dates back to the 
declaration of St Petersburg.     
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The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibits the use of projectiles below a certain 
specified weight, if they are explosive or charged with “fulminating or inflammable 
substances.” The 1899 and 1907 Hague Declarations and Conventions prohibit the use of 
bullets which expand or flatten in the human body, of poison or poisoned weapons, of 
unanchored automatic contact mines as well as of anchored mines which do not become 
harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings, and of torpedoes which 
do not become harmless when they have missed their target. The 1925 Geneva Protocol 
prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, 
materials and devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. The 1977 
Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the employment of techniques, which 
modify the environment to cause destruction, damage or injury to another state. The 1981 
Inhumane Weapons Convention prohibits the use of weapons the primary effect of which 
is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays, as well as 
laser weapons causing permanent blindness; it also restricts the use of landmines, booby-
traps and incendiary weapons. The above prohibitions apply to relations among parties to 
the relevant treaties. Some of them however, in particular the prohibitions under the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, are widely considered to be binding on parties and non-parties alike.139 
 
The notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do 
not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy.140 The aim of a 
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just war should be to secure the just cause, not to obliterate the enemy or to cause damage 
to the eco-system. In this regard all forms of atomic and thermo - nuclear weapons are 
considered disproportionate since these weapons have the capacity of ending all life on 
earth and devastating a whole civilization. 
 
Another dimension of the proportionality principle is the application of force in the 
battlefield. Despite the fact that the use of some weapons is considered legal, the force by 
which they are applied can become disproportionate. Walzer gave an example with the 
Vietnam War. 
An American unit moving along Route 18 received small arms fire from a 
village , and in reply the tactical commander called for artillery and air 
strikes on the village itself, resulting in heavy civilian casualties and 
extensive physical destruction.141 
 
Another case where disproportionality was highlighted is that of the Gulf war. During the 
war’s final days, there was a headlong retreat of Iraqi troops from Kuwait along a road, 
subsequently dubbed the “Highway of Death.”  So congested did that highway become 
that, when American forces descended upon it, it was a blood bath whose aftermath was 
much photographed and publicized. Although the Iraqi soldiers did not surrender, and 
thus remained legitimate targets, the killing was too easy .The battle degenerated into a 
turkey shoot and thus the force deployed was disproportionate.142 
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When a disproportionate means is used in the bid to secure a just cause, the outcome is 
normally the devaluation of that value which is being defended. A case in point is the 
intervention of American forces in Vietnam and the NATO forces in Kosovo. The official 
American version of the Vietnam war is that the American forces intervened in Vietnam 
to save the south Vietnamese from  invasion by the then North  Vietnam.143  However 
pure this intention was and the value it sought to defend, the disproportionate means that 
followed it devalued the value. Nagel articulated this disproportionate means when he 
said: 
In Indo-China, for example, there is a great deal of aerial bombardment 
strafing, spraying of napalm, and employment of pellet or needle spraying 
anti-personnel weapons against rural villages…. The majority of those 
killed and wounded in these aerial attacks are reported to be women and 
children… However the government regarded these civilian casualties as a 
regrettable side effect of what is a legitimate attack against an armed 
enemy.144 
 
In the case of Kosovo, the air raids were disproportionate to the extent that the value of 
life which it sought to protect, by removing Slobodan Milosevic, was devalued. Michael 
Evans, who was a senior research fellow in the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies 
Center, wrote: 
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The air war did not succeed in protecting the Kosovo population, indeed it 
worsened it and accelerated the humanitarian crisis because the Serbs 
systematically depopulated the province of Albanians. While NATO 
struck at the heartland of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was subjected to mass terror 
reminiscent of German SS field units in Eastern Europe during World War 
II. In trying to prevent genocide, the west used a military method-air 
power- which accelerated it.145  
 
The disproportionate means of air raid employed by NATO created an injustice out of 
the Kosovo intervention. Indeed Kosovo was a near disaster; legitimate political 
concerns led the NATO allies to wage war in a way that endangered the very people 
the war was supposed to defend.  Hence many regarded the intervention as a failure. 
Evans indicates the magnitude of the failure: 
Professor Michael Mandelbaum…has stated that the yardstick for judging 
the outcome of the war in Kosovo is simple. Ask the Kosovars if they are 
better off now than they were four months ago (before the air campaign). 
This is more than clever rhetoric. Before the air war, there were 45000 
refugees outside Kosovo; after the air war there were 855000. Even if 80% 
return, there will still be 1600000 refugees-quadruple the number that 
existed before the air war. If this is victory, then it is a dark victory.146    
 
The inevitability of proportionality remains, if there must be a limit to the human 
suffering caused by war and to protect those who are not implicated in the struggle. 
Therefore if nations are morally permitted to wage war in response to unjust aggression, 
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then the means employed must be judiciously selected in order to contain violence at the 
lowest level possible.  
 
3.3 NO MEANS MALA IN SE 
This criterion follows on the heels of the principle of proportionality. In addition to the 
prohibition of disproportionate force in battlefield, Just War Theory also forbids the use 
of means that are evil in themselves. Rawls concurs with Just War Theory when he 
admits that “even in a just war, certain forms of violence are strictly inadmissible.”147 
Since the aim of war is a just peace, then means that are employed must not destroy the 
possibility of peace or encourage the contempt of human life. Means that are evil in 
themselves may include rape, genocide or ethnic cleansing, using poison or biological 
weapons. 
 
It is important to point out why these means are termed evil in themselves. It does not 
mean that there are evils inherent in them. They are evil in themselves because they 
produce long-term evil consequences that are not part of the aim of securing the just 
cause. Using rape as a tool of warfare is a clear example. Rape is a crime where the 
victim is forced into sexual activity against his or her will. It still stands as a crime 
whether in war or in peace, because it violates the right of the person to choose his or her 
sexual partner. It also devalues his or her autonomy and renders him or her a mere object 
of sexual gratification. A case in point where rape has been employed as a means of war 
is during the Second World War, when French-Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian forces 
raped over 2000 women ranging from the age of eleven to eighty- six in May 19th 1944 at 
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Monte Cassino. These same troops raped around 500 women in Blackforrest town of 
Freeudenstadt.148 Two sisters aged fifteen and eighteen were raped by dozens of soldiers 
each.  One died from the abuse, the other was still in a mental hospital in 1997, 53 years 
after the event. Such long-term psychological trauma is what makes rape evil and 
condemnable in war. 
 
The psychological trauma that results from the use of rape as a means of war remains 
indelible in the mind of the victims and their relatives such that even after the war, 
reconciliation remains impossible. The victims may continue to nurse the intention of 
revenge. Historical evidence points to the situation in Congo DRC, where rape and 
counter rape has been a defining characteristic of war and such reconciliation has 
remained impossible since 1998. 
 
The savagery of using rape as a means of war cannot be over emphasized. The 
spokesman of the UN world Food Programme has stated that “the nature of sexual 
violence in DRC conflict is grotesque, completely abnormal. Babies, children, women-
nobody is being spared…never before have we found as many victims of rape in conflict 
situations as we are discovering in the DRC.”149 Widespread occurrence of the use of 
objects, such as guns, sticks and knives, to penetrate victims who are often as young as 
three years old has been reported. A person who has suffered such attacks during wartime 
will find it very difficult to talk of reconciliation and peace. 
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It is based on this danger to reconciliation that Kant warned that “states at war with 
another should not permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence 
impossible during a future time of peace.”150 When mass rape is used as a means in 
warfare, the danger of sexually transmitted diseases becomes prevalent, especially the 
deadly HIV/AIDS epidemic which also has a long term evil consequence. 
 
Biological weapons are also seen as evil in themselves. Biological weapons refer to 
microorganisms, which   infect and grow in the target host, producing a clinical disease 
that kills or incapacitates the targeted host. Such microbes may be natural, wild-type 
strains, or may be the result of genetically engineered organisms. The more common and 
lethal biological agents are Bacillus anthrax and Francisella tularensis (tularemia). 
Biological weapons may target living organisms or an environment seen as affecting the 
outcome of a war. These include humans, soldiers and noncombatants, commercial crops 
and animals, the water supply, the soil, the air, or any combination of these. The objective 
is, in each case, to weaken, terrify or punish the enemy to a degree which induces them to 
comply with the attacker’s demands. 
 
The awful nature of using such biological weapons is that they continue to incapacitate or 
to prevent recovery after one’s status as a combatant ends. Biological weapons also have 
the capacity of interfering with normal behaviour of individuals and their progeny, by 
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interfering with the hormones of targeted victims. This act logically extends the war to 
the unborn even when the war must have ended.  
 
Genocide and ethnic cleansing on their own are evils which ought to be condemned. 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  (a) killing members of the 
group;  (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part;  (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group;  (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.151  
 
Just War Theory condemns the use of genocide as a means in the execution of a war. 
Waging a war against an unjust aggressor does not amount to waging war against his 
nationals or ethnic group. Many people would like to argue that since an unjust aggressor 
is part of an ethnic group or religion, the tendency that such a group or religion will 
produce a replica of such an aggressor is high. The danger of such argument is great. 
Hitler once used such argument in his speech delivered in Salzburg, 7 August 1920, when 
he said: 
Don’t be misled into thinking you can fight a disease without killing the 
bacillus. Don’t think you can fight racial tuberculosis without taking care 
to rid the nation of the carrier of that racial tuberculosis. This Jewish 
                                                 




contamination will not end, until the carrier himself, the Jew, has been 
banished from our midst.152 
The result of this kind of argument culminated in the holocaust where more than six 
million Jews were killed. Using genocide as a means in war would only lead to a war of 
extermination, which in the words of Kant, “would allow perpetual peace only on the vast 
grave yard of human race.”  Besides the long - term evil consequences of using the above 
discussed means in battlefield, their capacity to stall reconciliation render them 
completely indefensible for war. 
 
3.4 NO REPRISAL 
Reprisal is an act or acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which would otherwise be 
unlawful, resorted to by one of the belligerents against an enemy personnel or property 
for acts of warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation of the law of war, for 
the purpose of enforcing future compliance with the recognized rules of civilized warfare. 
Just War Theory condemns any act of reprisal in war because it falls short of the proper 
justification of punishment. An example where a reprisal attack was carried out was in 
World War II, when the French forces of the interior continued to fight German 
occupation forces in France. Germany refused to treat members of the French resistance 
as combatants, even though they wore insignia, carried their arms openly, and were in 
touch with both the Allies and the French provisional government in Algeria, and 
subjected them to summary execution despite formal protest by the provisional 
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government. The French forces of the interior threatened reprisals, and when the 
executions did not stop, they shot eighty German soldiers under their control.153  
 
Following the spirit of the Just War Theory, International Law has sought to ban reprisal 
in wars. In the Geneva Convention of 1949, it was explicitly stated in Art. 33 that “no 
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. 
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are 
prohibited…Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.” 
 
Reprisal is a case of returning evil for evil, but while the evil seems to be returned, a new 
one is being committed that has a new victim. This then falls short of the idea of 
punishment, which seeks to punish the person that violated the act in question. Since the 
one who committed the act cannot be reached, then the nearest person will stand in for 
him, and by standing in for him the aim of what is sought, namely to force the other 
person to obey the rules of war, will be achieved. Just War Theory does not accept this 
kind of utilitarian argument. Kant wrote that 
[J]udicial punishment can never be used as a means to promote some other 
good for the criminal himself or for the civil society, but instead it must in 
all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a 
crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to 
the purpose of someone else.154  
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Reprisal is a typical case where judicial punishment is violated.  Non-combatants are 
used as bargaining power or enforcing power and thus another wrong is committed, 
namely the violation of non-combatant immunity. Just War Theory prohibits reprisal, 
since two wrongs can never make a right. Reprisal is a recipe for the escalation of war, a 
phenomenon Just War Theory utterly rejects. 
 
It is pertinent to point out that the onus of maintaining the Jus in bello principles falls on 
the shoulders of commanders in battle, since they command the troops and have the 
authority to direct the soldiers in the battlefield. They also run the risk of charges of war 
crime if the jus in bello principles are violated. Therefore being a commander in 
battlefield is very demanding since “commanding is harder than obeying; and not only 
because he who commands must carry the burden of all who obey and because this 
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 4.0 JUS POST BELLUM 
Jus post bellum, which literarily means justice after war, is the third phase of the Just War 
Theory. The main aim of the jus post bellum principle is to seek for the end of hostilities 
and regulate the transition from war back to peace. This regulation is necessary to 
achieve the comprehensiveness and completeness sought by Just War Theory. In the 
words of Immanuel Kant, “International right is thus concerned partly with the right to 
make war, partly with the right of war itself, and partly with the questions of rights after a 
war.”156 It is possible to have a war that has been justly fought, but because of the lack of 
any comprehensive ethical exit strategy, the war turns out to be unjust. This reality 
plagued the Bosnia war, which saw many failed negotiations and as such the war dragged 
on up to three years while the very negotiations took place. The need for an ethical exit 
strategy is also plaguing the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
The imperative of justice after war stems from the need to maintain the rights of the 
defeated aggressor state and her citizens. Mere military victory or a peace treaty cannot 
decide these rights. A peace treaty may put an end to the war, but not that general warlike 
condition within which pretexts can always be found for a new war. Therefore allowing 
war termination to be determined without normative restraints may lead to confusion and 
inconsistencies. The raw fact of victory does not of itself confer rights on the victor, nor 
duties on the vanquished, otherwise “might” will be misconstrued as “right”. To avoid 
the problem of might is right, and to create the environment for securing the rights of the 
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vanquished aggressor state, jus post bellum sets out some principles that must be 
followed to ensure a true return to peace. 
 
4.1 ENDS OF JUST WAR 
The first principle that Just War Theory sets out with regard to the terminating phase of 
war is what may be referred to as the “ends” of war. This refers to that which a state that 
is prosecuting war justly will aim at reinstating. This will set the limit for the war. As 
Walzer puts it: 
We need to seek the legitimate ends of war, the goals that can rightly be 
aimed at. These will also be the limits of a just war. Once they are won, or 
once they are within political reach, the fighting should stop. Soldiers 
killed beyond that point die needlessly, and to force them to fight and 
possibly die is a crime akin to that of aggression itself.157 
 
It follows then that a just termination of war does not necessarily mean the total 
capitulation or disarming of the enemy. Clausewitz  also pointed this out by saying that, 
“the disarming of the enemy – this object of war in the abstract, this final means of 
attaining the political object, in which all other means are included – does not always 
occur in practice and is not a necessary condition to peace.”158 A war need not therefore 
always be fought out until one of the parties is overthrown. This will make explicit the 
intention of being open to peace and not merely fighting a war of revenge. 
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It is often contended that the just goal of a just war is the status quo ante bellum: the 
victorious just regime ought simply to reestablish the state of affairs, which obtained 
before the war broke out. However, many theorists like Walzer and Orend pointed out 
that such assertion makes no sense at all. One ought not want the literal restoration of the 
status quo ante bellum because such a situation was precisely what led to the war and 
such literal restoration is empirically impossible.159 These theorists argue that war simply 
changes too much. So the just goal of a just war, once won, must be a more secure and 
more just state of affairs than that which existed prior to the war. Walzer refers to this 
condition as “restoration plus.”160  Vitoria earlier suggested a condition similar to that of 
Walzer by saying that “the situation with regard to war will be glaringly unfair if all that 
a state could do when enemies attack it unjustly was to ward off the attack and if they 
could not follow this up by further steps.”161   
 
The question will then be, what will a condition of restoration plus entail?  Orend holds 
that such a condition entails a more secure possession of our rights, both individual and 
collective.162 The aim of a just and lawful war will then be the resistance of aggression 
and the vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities, ultimately on 
behalf of the human rights of their individual citizens. Orend and Walzer seem to follow 
Rawls in claiming that, in our era, no deeper or more basic, political values exist than 
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those human rights that justify a reasonable set of social institutions and ultimately enable 
a satisfying political existence.163 
 
The establishment of the condition of “restoration plus”, namely the vindication of those 
rights that were violated by the very act of aggression, can be more easily achieved in a 
war of humanitarian intervention than a war of aggression, that is when a nation invades 
the other. In a war of humanitarian intervention, the vindication of the rights of the 
people can be secured by overthrowing the unjust regime and the subsequent institution 
of a more pro-human right government. But the condition of restoration plus becomes 
problematic in the case of aggressive war, since Orend affirms that:  
[T]he principle of rights vindication forbids the continuation of war after 
the relevant rights have in fact been vindicated… This bedrock limit to the 
justified continuance of a just war seems required in order to prevent the 
war from spilling over into something like a crusade, which demands the 
utter destruction of the demonized enemy.164 
The difficulty of restoration plus becomes clear, how do we ensure more secure rights or 
how do we forbid such future aggression? The two ways to do it are either beefing up the 
victim’s military capacity, so that it becomes a deterrent factor to the aggressor, or 
weakening and dissolution of the enemy’s  military capacity so that he no longer 
possesses the potentialities for future aggression. If the latter way is taken, then the war 
will go beyond the limits of a just war, as Orend pointed out. 
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An example is the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The allied forces, led by the United 
States, succeeded in rolling back the aggression, namely forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. 
However, the reestablishment of Kuwaiti borders cannot be said to be a situation of 
“restoration plus.” As Walzer himself noted, restoration plus will demand “the liberation 
of Kuwait and the defeat and reduction of Iraqi military power.”165  If one follows 
Walzer’s argument, then the condition of restoration plus would have demanded an 
invasion of Iraq after the liberation of Kuwait.  Justice after war does not end with the 
restoration of the rights of political communities and their citizens, but also involves the 
issue of war crime trials, compensation and rehabilitation.   
 
4.2   WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
The commission of aggression, as a serious international crime, requires punishment. 
However Just War Theory emphasizes that despite the depravity of the act of aggression, 
the aggressor should be tried in a competent court of law.166  This is to ensure “that the 
punishment which we inflict on the guilty must be such as equity and humanity allow.”167 
A competent court here may be the International Criminal Court (ICC) or any tribunal set 
up by the international community or its representatives, the United Nations. Therefore it 
follows that men and women who play prominent roles in the commission of war crimes 
must be brought to trial and punished for their offences. It is also the onus of the court or 
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tribunal to determine the extent of culpability of criminals and mete out appropriate 
punishments. 
 
There are two classes of war crimes, following the previously discussed parts of war, 
namely, jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Any violation of the required justice of these two 
parts constitutes a crime that requires trial.  Jus ad bellum crimes come under what the 
Nuremberg tribunal referred to as crimes against peace. This involves: (i) planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurance; (ii) participation in a common plan to 
engage in  any of the acts mentioned under (i). 
 
Leaders and prominent members of aggressor state governments are usually the ones that 
are charged with crimes against peace. Following in this category of crime against peace, 
is another crime that the Nuremberg tribunal referred to as “crimes against humanity.” 
This consists in murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts 
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds. These conditions, as I discussed earlier, serve as a just cause for a war of 
intervention. After such a war, justice after war also demands that the perpetrators be 
brought to trial. One such case was the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, who died on the 11th 
of March 2006, for his crimes against the ethnic Albanians. 
 
One of the difficulties in the trial of Jus ad bellum war criminals is that it is not easy to 
capture such criminals. As Walzer pointed out, the feature of the domestic model (the 
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legalist paradigm) is not easily carried over into international arena, where criminals are 
rounded up and brought for trial.168 The rounding up of the aggressor, as I pointed out 
earlier in discussing the condition of  “restoration plus”, is a daunting task. It may require 
a military conquest, and conquest has effects that reach far beyond the people who are 
rounded up. It prolongs a war in which large numbers of innocent men and women are 
virtually certain to die. The major question will remain, if given knowledge of what will 
happen if aggressor leaders are sought after for trial, are we still justified in rounding 
them up? Opinions may differ here. Some may incline to say that given the nature of the 
aggressive acts of such leaders, and the quest to ensure that they do not reoccur, the 
resultant casualties that may occur should not deter us from going after them.  Another 
view suggests that we should not engage in a war of conquest to round the leaders up 
since it will involve civilian casualties. Rather, we can confine such leaders to their 
states, and arrest them when they leave their states. This argument on its own seems 
plausible, but the injustice will seem to persist if the aggressor state or leader has allied 
nations that may not subscribe to the arrest of such leaders in their country. This will then 
seem like a case of rewarding or not punishing aggression since the leaders will be able to 
travel to allied nations.  
 
The second difficulty that may be encountered in the bid to bring aggressor leaders to 
trial is that sometimes, in spite of the moral decrepitude of such leaders, they retain 
considerable popular legitimacy, and thus bringing them to trial could seriously 
destabilize the polity of the aggressor. This factor manifested itself during the end of the 
Second World War. There were attempts by numerous leaders, among them President 
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Harry S Truman, to have Hirohito put on trial for alleged war crimes, but U.S. General 
Douglas MacArthur insisted that Hirohito remain Emperor to keep him as a symbol of the 
continuity and cohesion of the Japanese people.169  Hirohito was spared trial and retained 
the throne.  
 
I am inclined to say that an aggressor leader, who has lost popularity in his state, should 
be rounded up, even though such an act may inevitably result in casualties. Such 
casualties should not deter us from rounding him up, since the rounding up of such a 
leader will also be to the utmost interest of the citizens. From this argument, I am inclined 
to justify the current invasion of Iraq, if given that Saddam Hussein has lost legitimacy 
from his people and had turned savagely upon them,  it is also an attempt to bring him to 
trial for the war crimes he committed during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Another 
question arises here, granted that the invasion of Iraq is in part an attempt to bring 
Saddam to justice, can an individual or a state be brought to trial after a long period of 
committing a crime.  The length of time that elapsed as I see it cannot be an argument 
against the bringing of an individual to trial. If the individual is tried in spite of the 
elapsed time, it will serve as a deterrent to others who may be tempted to follow the foot 
steps of such individual. They will come to understand that even time will not shield 
them from trial. It will also serve as a rehabilitative measure to the individual, in the 
sense that the punishment will enable him to realize that what he did in years back was an 
offence. So it follows that despite the fact that Saddam’s crime was committed thirteen 
years earlier, it is justified that he is brought to justice. However, I will quickly add that 
the United States is not the proper authority to prosecute the war for Saddam’s trial (if 
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actually the war is an attempt to bring Saddam to justice). She lacks the moral legitimacy 
for such an act. The U.S repudiated the institution of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which has the jurisdiction of trying war criminals and has refused to ratify the 
agreement that founded it.170 This singular act renders her illegitimate for the prosecution 
of any war for trial of war crimes. 
 
Jus ad bellum war crime trials are not the only one mandated by Just War Theory. 
Violation of jus in bello principles are also regarded as war crimes. In fact the Nuremberg 
tribunal principle VI (b) properly referred to the violation of jus in bello principles as war 
crimes, which include, but are not limited to, “ murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave-labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity.”  A clear case of a jus in bello crime is the 
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam war. A company of American soldiers entered the 
Vietnamese village where they expected to encounter enemy combatants, but instead 
found only civilians, old men, women and children, and began to kill them, shooting 
them singly or collecting them in groups, ignoring their obvious helplessness and pleas 
for mercy, not stopping until they have killed between four and five hundred people.171 
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The primary responsibility of these war crimes must fall on the shoulders of those 
soldiers, officers and military commanders who were most actively involved in their 
commission. These officers are duty bound not to issue orders that violate any aspect of 
the laws of war. Furthermore they must plan military campaigns so that foreseeable 
civilian casualties are minimized, and must teach and train their soldiers not only about 
combat but also about the rules of Just War Theory and laws of armed conflict.172  
 
Despite the fact that soldiers are trained to obey, some crimes in war cannot be 
exonerated on the basis of obedience to orders. Soldiers have often argued that when they 
took the army oath, they freed themselves of the consequences of what they do, since 
they do what they are asked to do. But as Walzer pointed out, “there is some ultimate 
humanity that cannot be broken down, the disappearance of which we will not accept.”173 
Therefore in the case of the Mai Lai massacre, what is required of soldiers in that 
situation is that they refuse the orders - the illegal or immoral orders - of their superior.174 
It then follows that the combat soldiers may also be liable to war crime trial along side 
their commanders when it has been proved that they were accomplices of a crime.  
 
It is also pertinent to point out that jus in bello crimes can be committed by both parties in 
war. Therefore in order to avoid double standards, the justified side in the war must, 
despite the justice of their cause in resorting to war, be willing to submit the members of 
her military who have committed jus in bello crimes for trial. 
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 4.3 COMPENSATION    
Any pecuniary or material remedy that is awarded to an individual, who has sustained an 
injury, in order to replace the loss caused by the said injury, is referred to as 
compensation.  Since aggression is a crime that violates important rights and causes much 
damage, it is reasonable and pertinent that the aggressor nation be mandated to 
compensate the victim of aggression. If there were no aggression in the first place, the 
victim would not have to fight for her rights and subsequently would not engage in any 
form of reconstruction. Therefore it will be a gross injustice to allow the victim of 
aggression to bear the brunt of her reconstruction alone. The critical question will then 
be, how much and from whom in the aggressor state is the compensation to be paid out? 
 
How much the aggressor will be required to pay will definitely depend on the severity of 
the damages caused by the aggressor. This raises another question, who determines the 
severity of the damage? The necessity of determining post war compensation provided 
the rationale for the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), which was 
created in 1991 by the United Nations (UN) as a subsidiary organ of the UN Security 
Council, in order to compensate monetarily those injured personally and financially by 
Iraq’s illegal actions during the Persian Gulf War (Gulf War). The commission had the 
mandate to determine the level of compensation needed, and subsequently force Iraq to 
assume civil liability for the damage that it caused during its illegal invasion of Kuwait. It 
also imposed upon Iraq an unprecedented civil compensation system directed at 
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monetarily recompensing those individuals, entities, and governments that sustained 
losses during the war.175 
 
In the consideration of the “from whom” question, Orend  has suggested that care need to 
be taken by the victorious victim and/or any third – party vindicator on behalf of the 
victim not to unduly penalize the civilian population of the  aggressor  state for the 
aggression carried out by its regime.176 He thereby suggests that any monetary 
compensation ought to come first and foremost from the personal wealth of those 
political and military elites in the aggressor state who were most responsible for the crime 
of aggression.177 Orend’s presumption here stems from the fact that many aggressive 
leaders use their power internally to raise considerable personal fortunes. 
 
Orend’s suggestion is quite plausible, but there are some difficulties associated with it. 
Firstly, he ignored the fact that most aggressive leaders stash up their fortunes in foreign 
countries, especially their allies. It becomes very difficult to gain access to these fortunes 
in order to use them for compensatory reasons, since such allies will not buy the idea of 
relinquishing them. Secondly, some leaders are the sole signatories of their foreign 
accounts. It then means that the death of such leaders renders their accounts inaccessible 
and some states in whose banks such money are deposited may decide to confiscate it. 
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 Walzer, on the other hand, holds that the materials needed for the compensation can 
hardly be collected only from those members of the aggressor state who were active 
supporters of the aggression.   Since citizenship is a collective destiny, the issue of 
compensation should be distributed among the citizens of the aggressor state. This can be 
done by distributing the costs of compensation through the tax system and through the 
economic system generally among all the citizens over a period of time. He however 
quickly added that the distribution of costs does not amount to the distribution of guilt.178 
Walzer, by suggesting a post war taxation on citizens of an aggressor state, failed to 
understand the proper justification of punishment, which holds that punishment be 
imposed only on those who committed the offence. A post war tax on all citizens will be 
punishing those who did not approve of the war and had vehemently opposed it. It will be 
a complete act of injustice. Consider a peasant farmer who will be asked to pay tax for 
compensation of a war, when he has not succeeded in feeding himself. In fact how will 
the tax be distributed? Will it be equal for every one, or will it be based on the richer the 
more principle? 
 
There is a third option, which is the use of a state’s natural resources to pay for the 
compensation of the victim state. This option was adopted by the United Nations through 
the United Nations Compensation Commission during the end of the Persian Gulf War.  
Pursuant to Resolution 687, the Security Council determined that the UNCC would retain 
30% of Iraq’s oil revenues in order to pay the UNCC’s operating costs and the successful 
claims.179 The UNCC received the money from a UN created escrow account into which 
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importing Member States paid oil revenues directly,180 and it was through this account 
that the UN drew the money for the required compensation. This third option is also not 
devoid of difficulties. These difficulties include: 
 
(1) Presence of natural resources. 
 A compensation system comparable to the one that existed for the Gulf War victims is 
economically feasible only in very limited circumstances. Many aggressive or would be 
aggressive states lack the natural resources to be used for compensation. A concrete 
example is that of Serbia.181 Serbia lacked the wealth, be it in natural resources or 
monetary capacity that will warrant the institution of a compensatory system akin to that 
of the Gulf War. Furthermore, such natural resources or wealth must not be private and 
must not have been destroyed during the war. Next, the liable nation’s wealth must be 
easily accessible to the UN because “a claims process is not likely to produce much 
actual compensation unless the respondent has a source of funds that can be generated or 
tapped outside its territory.”182 
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Before the UN can subject a nation to a civil compensation system, not only must that 
nation possess some form of wealth, but that wealth also must have a high degree of 
liquidity. If a country, for example, were rich in oil but did not have the capacity to 
produce that oil, the UN would be taking an extraordinary step if it either seized the raw 
natural resource or forced the owner nation to develop the means to export the resource 
for the purpose of funding a compensation system. The UN most likely never will take 
either of these steps.183 It is worthwhile to note that care needs to be taken not to bankrupt 
the aggressor’s resources in the bid to compensate its victim, since civilians of the 
aggressor state have claims that these resources be devoted to them. 
 
4.4 REHABILITATION 
Rehabilitation simply means, “to put back in good condition”. The aggressor state can be 
said to have been in a bad condition, which generated the bad effect of war. Therefore 
there is the need for a post war rehabilitation, which will aim at putting back the hitherto 
condition into a good state. Rehabilitation can be of two parts, namely military 
rehabilitation and political rehabilitation. Since war cannot be waged without a military 
build up, an aggressor state may be required to demilitarize at least to the extent that it 
will not pose a serious threat to victims and other members of the international 
community for the foreseeable future. The level of demilitarization will clearly depend on 
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the nature and severity of the aggression and the residual military capabilities following 
its defeat. 
After the First World War, Part V of the Versailles Treaty proceeded to lay down 
exceedingly precise limitations on various aspects of Germany’s military establishment. 
The German army was capped at 100,000 actives and officer corps limited to a mere 
4,000 staff, such numbers to be achieved by March 1920.184 The German navy was 
similarly limited, 185 and the air force was completely abolished.186 As for war material, 
Germany was strictly prohibited from possessing armaments and munitions in excess of 
the limits established under the treaty.187 
Demilitarization as a means of rehabilitation was also pursued in Iraq after the Persian 
Gulf War. The United Nations Resolution 687 placed a ban on the means of production 
for conventional weapons and personnel or materials for training or technical support 
services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of 
those items.188 The Council decided also that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of its 
chemical and biological weapons, its missile launchers with a range greater than 150 
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kilometers, as well as research, development, support, manufacturing, repair and 
production facilities for those items.189 
Additionally, the Security Council sanctioned the enforcement of operational restrictions 
on the Iraqi military. The most important of these was the no-fly zones in Northern Iraq 
(to shield Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein’s reprisals) and Southern Iraq (to 
protect Shi’I Muslims populations and to grant an air buffer zone between Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait). These restrictions were aimed at preventing Iraqi projection of 
power in the region or the use of Iraqi military to coerce a restive population.190  
Proportionality should also be brought to bear in the demilitarization exercise.  The 
regime in the aggressor state may not be so demilitarized as to jeopardize its ability to 
fulfill its function of maintaining law and order within its own borders, and of protecting 
its people from other countries which might be tempted to invade if they perceive serious 
weakness in the aggressor.191 
Walzer and Orend opine that after the War the victim and any vindicator must aim at the 
construction and maintenance of a new kind of domestic political regime within the 
aggressor state, one more peaceable, orderly and pro-human rights in nature. However, 
they differ in terms of aggressive wars. While Walzer believes that the conquest and 
political reconstruction can only be the consequences of a just war when the defeated 
                                                 
189 Ibid.,  para 8. 
  
190 David J. Bederman , “ Collective Security, Demilitarization and ‘Pariah’ States”, European Journal Of 
International Law, vol. 13, no. 1, 2002, p.127. 
 
191  B. Orend ,  “Justice After War,”  op. cit. ,   p.50. 
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rulers are moral monsters like the Nazis in Germany in World War II,192 Orend questions 
the rationale behind such discriminatory political rehabilitation. “Given the serious nature 
of any act of aggression – so serious by Walzer’s  own light, it justifies war - why should 
we refrain from imposing political reform upon the defeated aggressor, unless its regime 
is as bad as the Nazi?”193  He rather favours the rehabilitative measures in the domestic 
political structure of a defeated aggressor, arguing that Walzer’s reluctance to permit 
institutional restructuring may reveal the limitations to his strong commitment to national 
sovereignty.194 Indeed, Walzer can be said to have a strong attachment to sovereignty, as 
can be seen in his understanding of the Just War Theory. He said: 
[T]he theory as it was commonly understood did not extend to any radical 
reconstitution of the enemy state, and international law with its 
assumptions about sovereignty, would have regarded any  imposed change 
of regime as a new act of aggression.195               
However, regime change and political reconstruction can be said to be the legitimate and 
direct aim of wars of intervention, since if there were no regime change, the humanitarian 
crises that led to the war would still persist. Walzer actually advocated for a longer stay 
of the intervening power if the policies and practices that need to be stopped are widely 
supported and sustained by local structures and cultures.196 
                                                 
192 Walzer,  Just and Unjust Wars, p.113. Arguing about War, .p.149. 
 
193 B. Orend, ibid. , p.50. 
 
194 Ibid., p.51. 
 
195 Walzer,   Arguing about War,  p.18. 
196 Ibid., p.72. 
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If the intervening power will stay for a political reconstruction, two forms of political 
rehabilitation become clear, as Walzer pointed out. First is a kind of trusteeship, where 
the intervening power actually rules the country it rescued, acting in trust for the 
inhabitants seeking to establish a stable and more or less consensual politics. The second 
is a kind of protectorate, where the intervention brings some local group or coalition of 
groups to power and is then sustained only defensively, to ensure that there is no return of 
the defeated regime or the old lawlessness, and that minority rights are respected. Walzer 
actually suggested that Rwanda might be a candidate for trusteeship and Bosnia for a 
protectorate.197  
I will however opt for a form of multilateral protectorate in wars of intervention, while 
rejecting totally that of trusteeship. This is due to the danger that may result from 
trusteeships.  Ever since Roman times, empires have expanded by intervening in civil 
wars, replacing “anarchy” with law and order, overthrowing supposedly noxious regimes. 
Conceivably, this expansion has saved lives, but only by creating in the process a 
“prison-house of nations”, whose subsequent history is a long tale of prison revolts, 
brutally repressed.198 Therefore to avoid the danger of expansionism being cloaked in the 
garment and semblance of intervention, indigenous people should be supported 
defensively and monitored, to ensure that a true political rehabilitation is carried out. 
Despite the danger of expansionism, there is another danger that may arise in any bid to 
rehabilitate an aggressor politically. This danger I will look at in the following Chapter. 
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                                    CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 THE DANGER IMPLICIT IN POLITICAL REHABILITATION 
In the last Chapter, I pointed out the danger of expansionism that may be cloaked in the 
intention of political rehabilitation, but that does not exhaust the dangers of political 
rehabilitation. Therefore I want to consider another type of danger that may come about 
in the bid to rehabilitate the unjust aggressor. This danger can stem from the cultural 
background of the victim or vindicator.  
 
Every human culture has widespread roots or sources, many of which can be traced to 
other cultural traditions. It then means that not all the elements of a people’s culture or 
tradition are indigenous in their genesis; not all of them were necessarily originated by 
those people and can be said to be unique to them. However, it is pertinent to point out 
that despite the historical and potential capacity of cultures to assimilate elements of 
other cultures, it should not lead to us to conclude that a culture must be made to 
assimilate an element or elements of another culture, even when such a culture recognizes 
the positive nature of such elements. Therefore the potential danger implicit in the issue 
of cultural contacts and cultural assimilation is the danger of “forced acculturation”. 
Forced acculturation then refers to the attempt by a powerful technological199 culture to 
infuse the elements of its alien cultural system on a people of different cultural 
background. Inevitably this type of aggressive imposition of alien cultural forms and 
modes on a people with different cultural vision and disposition always lead to a situation 
                                                 
199 “powerful technological”  here does not refer to a high scientific prowess, rather it means that the said 
culture has an upper hand in the situation of contact with the other culture, and also possesses the skill and 
status to impart its own values. 
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of conflict or clash of two cultural systems. The conflict stems from the act of forcing, 
since it negates the autonomy of the people of such a culture and subdues their freewill. 
 
The Post Bellum condition inevitably brings two or more cultures into contact, namely 
that of the victim or vindicator, and that of the conquered aggressor. The case of political 
rehabilitation makes the contact more intense. However, in this contact, as I have 
indicated earlier, the vindicator or the victim has an upper hand. The danger of forced 
acculturation in Jus Post Bellum then becomes clear. If the unjust aggressor is to be 
rehabilitated, who will carry out the rehabilitation? The danger of forced acculturation in 
political rehabilitation will be very high if the victorious victim or vindicator is guided by 
the Orendian metaphorical conception of war. Orend argued that  
Metaphorically, one might say that a just war, justly prosecuted, is 
something like radical surgery - an extreme yet necessary measure to be 
taken in defense of life and fundamental values (like human rights) against 
serious, lethal threats. And if just war, justly prosecuted, is like radical 
surgery, then the justified conclusion to such a war can only be akin to the 
rehabilitation and therapy required after the surgery, in order to ensure that 
the original intent is effectively consolidated and secured, and that the 
patient is materially better off than she was prior to the exercise.200 
It follows then that the victorious victim or any vindicator will view the entire political 
culture of the aggressor as a part of the system that requires surgery and consequently a 
disregard for the values of such a culture. 
                                                 





It should be noted that the major aim of Jus Post Bellum is the creation of conditions for a 
more “secure possession of rights”, but it is also pertinent to point out that the right to 
culture, including a political culture, is also a human right, such that any manipulation or 
domination of a culture, even in the bid to implement the principles of Jus Post Bellum, is 
an abuse. Walzer seems to have this consciousness when he stated that  
[T]he rights of private persons can be recognized in international society, 
as in the UN Charter of Human Rights, but they cannot be enforced 
without calling into question the dominant values of that society: the 
survival and independence of the separate political communities.201  
 
This may also explain why he opts for the reservation of political rehabilitation to Nazi -
like regimes. All in all, Jus Post Bellum seeks to restore human rights, but this act of 
restoration should not lead to the tendency of violating one human right in order to secure 
another. 
 
It might be argued that, given a situation where a social injustice exists in the aggressive 
state, and has been supported by the political system in place, why shouldn’t a triumphant 
victim or vindicator force the aggressor state into accepting a political system that will 
remove the social injustice? Again, given the fact that members of the aggressor state 
may not be homogenous in terms of their culture, why then is forced acculturation not 
justified if it protects minority cultures from oppression or domination? 
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103 
These arguments seem plausible in their own rights, but given the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, their plausibility diminishes. A vindicator or the triumphant victim, who 
now has the power of political rehabilitation, should bear in mind the difference between 
the political machinery of the state as institutionalized in the government, and the state 
itself. As Gleven puts it, “the government is never identified with the state. For one thing, 
the term ‘government’ obviously refers to those who govern, whereas the state seems to 
include those governed as well.”202 Therefore it will be reductionistic to equate state with 
government. From this point of view then it is pertinent to point out that sovereignty 
resides in the state and not in the government. It then follows that a vindicator or the 
victorious victim should know that he is still constrained by the demands of sovereignty 
not to interfere in the social life of the people, even though there may be pockets of 
injustice in the social system. Every existing government we know has condoned a 
certain level or degree of social injustice, but this does not justify an invasion by another 
state in order to curb the social injustice.  
 
The aim of jus post bellum, as I pointed out earlier, is a state of true peace, a state in 
which there will not be any pretext for further wars. The true sense of peace therefore 
consists in “letting others be but only if both the security and self confidence of one’s 
own nation is first assured.”203 The assurance of one’s own security was the reason why 
the vindicator or the triumphant victim went into political rehabilitation. Any form of 
social injustice in the aggressor state, which did not contribute to the insecurity of the 
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victim though it is an injustice in its own right must be left in the spirit of sovereignty to 
the dictates of the citizens of the state.  
 
However, as I pointed out earlier in chapter two, the sacred nature of sovereignty is not 
absolute.  It can be violated if and only if   the dominant forces within a state are engaged 
in massive violations of human rights, the enslavement or massacre of political 
opponents, national minorities and religious sects, and when a government turns    
savagely upon its own people. Then, and only then, can we doubt the very existence of a 
political community to which the idea of sovereignty applies. A vindicator or a 
triumphant victim, who did not wage a war based on the above causes, cannot invoke the 
same causes as the reasons for forcing a political system on the aggressor state. 
 
A further argument against this danger of forced acculturation is that the members of the 
aggressor state could not stop their government from waging an aggressive war against 
another state. They have lost their sovereignty and therefore can be forced into accepting 
any political system imposed on them. The fallacious nature of this argument is clear. It 
presumes that by being members or citizens of a state, individuals always have the power 
to stop the government from performing certain actions. History attests to the fact that 
some governments have been ushered in by the will of the people, but they then hijacked 
the political machinery without listening to the voice of the people. Therefore when such 
governments act, in the case of aggressive wars, they lose their legitimacy and are liable 




Therefore, it can be said that the government of a state in prosecuting an aggressive war, 
causes the state to lose partial sovereignty, that is, the right of non-incursion by other 
states into its political sphere. However, sovereignty is not tied to political autonomy; it 
includes social organization (be it classless or stratified) and religious organization (be it 
repressive or freedom oriented), and these must be respected.  
 
It would be illuminating to consider the danger of forced acculturation in the light of 
current events. After the American-led war in Afghanistan204 that saw the exit of the 
Taliban, there followed a series of debates with regard to regime change in Afghanistan. 
In what followed, President Bush on October 11, 2002 backed out from a suggested plan 
to install an American-led military government in Iraq, stating that the United States 
“would never seek to impose our culture on or our form of government on another 
nation”205, yet an administration that rejected an American-led military government went 
on to foist democracy on the Afghan people. The methodology of the political 
rehabilitation undermined the people’s autonomy and free participation in the election 
process. Peter Symonds pointed out that “the presence of thirty thousand U.S troops 
precluded any genuine democratic choice by the country’s voters. The election was 
staged and to further entrench the position of Washington’s puppet-Hamid Karzai”.206 
 
                                                 
204 The war in Afghanistan was seen as a just war. Many just war proponents endorsed it including Michael 
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Review, vol. 51, Num.18, Nov 18, 2004, p.34. 
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On the other hand, the Iraqi elections have been embraced almost universally as a great 
victory for the forces of Democracy, not only in Iraq but also throughout the entire 
Middle East. The fact, however, is “that the Iraqi elections weren’t about the free election 
of a government reflecting the will of the Iraqi people, but the carefully engineered 
selection of a government that would behave in a manner dictated by the United States. In 
Iraq democracy was hijacked by the Americans.”207 
 
It is pertinent to point out that from the above examples, my intention, on the one hand, is 
not to justify or critique the Iraqi and Afghan wars, and, on the other hand, not to attack 
the concept of democracy, but the methodology of its acculturation.  The supporters of 
democracy have said a lot about the concept of democracy. Orend has argued that 
democracy is not a western concept but a universally desired goal that has been defined 
and reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other declarations.208 
This conception of democracy still remains debatable. However, I would like to see 
democracy as a value that can be desired, but it should not be enforced by a foreign 
power.  
 
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the consequences of the forced acculturation and the resultant 
attempts to oppose it, can be seen in the continuous insurgency that takes place on a daily 
basis. These insurgencies have left many people dead and thus undermine the whole 
effort and intention of political rehabilitation.  No matter how valuable democracy is, if it 
is forced on a people, the value, which it parades, will be undercut, and the targeted 
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people will loath it. Farish A Noor expresses the feeling of the majority of Muslims and 
Arabs in this regard. He said: 
Bush destroys the values of western civilization. All the west has and 
could have stood for is now laid to ruin. Never again will the world 
believe that it stands for human rights and democracy. How can one 
impose democracy at gunpoint?…From today no one will live with the 
delusion that the U.S is a force for good in the world.209 
 
Therefore the danger of political rehabilitation as an element of Jus Post Bellum is the 
danger of forced acculturation, either overtly or surreptitiously. The question then 
remains, how do we avert this danger?  
 
First, I suggest that the onus of political rehabilitation for an unjust aggressor, where 
necessary, should be vested upon multi - national institutions, which also include the 
citizens of   the conquered aggressor. This will diffuse the tendency of a unilateral 
vindicator to remake the conquered state in its own image and likeness and also help to 
uphold its existing values. Iraq is a case in point where American unilateralism has 
succeeded in violating the existing values of a conquered state. American soldiers once 
burnt the bodies of dead Iraqis, which is forbidden by the Islamic cultures, and 
consequently triggered off a series of insurgencies.  Multilateralism also will diffuse the 
tendency of profiteering, in the guise of rehabilitation, which has a higher possibility with 
                                                 
209 Farish A. Noor, “The Old West Is Dead and a New West is Being Born,” Impact, April 2003 p.9-10. See 
also Mohammed Abu- Nimer “Pax Americana and Bush Doctrine in The Middle East,” in War and Border 
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a unilateral vindicator. Many people have argued that Iraq is an example where 
unilateralism brings about profiteering. Walzer comments:  
President Bush and his advisers seem committed to profiteering at the 
center. They claim to be bringing democracy to Iraq…. But with much 
greater speed and effectiveness, they have brought to Iraq the crony 
capitalism that now prevails in Washington. And this undercuts the 
legitimacy of the occupation and put its putative democratic goals in 
jeopardy. The distribution of contracts to politically connected American 
Companies is a scandal.210 
 
Secondly, I suggest that any political rehabilitation in an aggressor’s state should take 
into account the culture of the aggressor state. Those shouldering the onus of political 
rehabilitation must understand the degree to which the political system being introduced 
is familiar to the people for which it is being offered. However, as I said before, the 
familiarity of the political system being introduced does not call for its imposition on the 
people. Rather what is required is a method whereby the people are allowed to 
understand and gradually incorporate the system being introduced into their own culture 
and experience. An acculturation based on freedom. Those shouldering the onus of 
political rehabilitation have to create a facilitating physical and social environment for 
this kind of political rehabilitation. This then requires attention to and consideration of 
the social and political setting of the aggressor state.  
 
                                                 




In this regard, “the moment we suggest that Iraq never was a fertile soil for western 
democracy, we get accused of being racist. Do we think the Arabs are incapable of 
producing democracy, we are asked? Do we think they are sub humans?”211 But the main 
truth is that the western system of democracy is too alien212 to Iraq as well as the majority 
of Arab states. Arab states, as Garfinkle pointed out, lack some prerequisites for western 
model of democracy. These prerequisites include: the belief that the source of political 
authority is intrinsic to society; a concept of majority rule; and the acceptance of all 
citizens’ equality before the law.213 Without these three prerequisite, the western model 
of democracy will not flourish. The belief in the state as a source of political authority 
makes possible the idea of pluralism and the legitimacy of a loyal opposition. Without the 
concept of majority rule, the idea of elections as a means to form a government is 
incomprehensible. And without the equality of all citizens before the law, a polity can 
neither be free nor liberal as understood in the west.214 
 
However, the absence of these prerequisites does not call for a total skepticism on the 
possibility of democracy in Iraq and the Arab world in general.  The hope must be that 
within Islam and the Arab culture, there are seeds of democracy. Banerji pointed out that 
in places like Northern Jordan, Sheikhs serve tea and sweets under an awning in local 
gatherings, and villagers get a chance to influence the local government and the Sheikhs 
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origin and experience. Western model of democracy has not been experienced in Iraq prior to the political 
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to increase their standings in the area. Although, this is not democracy as we know it, 
there is a kind of “voice.”215 
 
Therefore in Iraq, as Richard Harries affirms: 
It is a mistake to believe that western-style liberal democracy can simply 
be imposed on a country with a very different culture and religious 
tradition... So I express the hope that the emergence of democracy in Iraq 
will develop in close consultation with religious leaders in particular, so 
that what emerges may not be regarded as alien to the culture, but 
compatible with and indeed, a flowering of it. But it is clear that, if 
democracy is to have a long-term future in Iraq, it needs to be appropriated 
in Islamic terms, not simply imposed in Western Secular ones.216  
 
It follows then that a detailed study of the culture of the aggressor state needs to be done, 
with such study taking into consideration the degree of familiarity of the political system 
being introduced in order to align the system of rehabilitation with the social 
environment. 
 
Montesquieu, writing in The Spirit of The Laws, also affirmed, “Laws should be 
appropriate to the people for whom they are made… They should be related to the 
physical aspects of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid or temperate …to the 
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religion of the inhabitants, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and 
their manners.”217 A political system for a people which is closely modeled after their 
culture and tradition is more likely to work, but if the constitution and selection process 
embedded in it are alien to the way leadership emerges in that social setting, there are 



















                                                 





I began with the location of Just War Theory amidst two opposing theories, namely 
Pacifism (especially the absolute type) and Permissivism. I then looked at the issue of Jus 
ad bellum, which sets out conditions that must be met before a war will be termed “Just.” 
I went further to examine the principles and problems with Jus in bello and Jus post 
bellum respectively, and tried to suggest a way out of the danger implicit in the bid to 
rehabilitate an unjust aggressor. 
 
Finally, Just War Theory can be said to be a plausible attempt to prevent the rush to send 
troops to war on the slightest provocation. However, once war has regrettably 
commenced, it also seeks to limit its catastrophic consequences by proscribing certain 
acts in the battlefield. Despite all the attempts to limit the consequences of war by Just 
War Theory, the communal dimension of war, coupled with the modern development of 
military technology, has made it difficult to adhere strictly to the normative requirements 
of Just War Theory. Perhaps Nagel is right that, “it is not easy to keep a firm grip on the 
idea of what is not permissible in warfare, because while some military actions are 
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